

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"The people of Vienna seem to vie with each other in demonstrations of love and veneration of the Emperor Napoleon, whom they justly regard as their deliverer. They have entered into a voluntary subscription, for the purpose of erecting a statue of him in bronze; and, they propose holding a Jubilee on the anniversary of the battle of Wagram."—MONITEUR.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE JUBILEE.—This would seem to be the year of *Jubilees*; for, the people of Warsaw, of Madrid, of Vienna, of Naples, and of many other places, are, by the public prints, said to be making bonfires and illuminations, and singing *Te Deums*; that is to say, singing psalms of praise to God. It is true, indeed, that, in these instances, God is to be thanked for the birth, life, and deeds of the Emperor Napoleon, and "for the manifold blessings enjoyed under his benignant sway;" whereas our people propose to thank God in form, to sing psalms of praise to *their Creator*, for the birth, life, and deeds of our King, and "for the blessings enjoyed under *his* benignant sway;" and, moreover, to bestow, at the same time, a few execrations upon that same Napoleon, on whom the other nations of Europe are bestowing so many blessings, and whom our people assert to be a despot, a merciless squeezer and grinder of his abject subjects, and, indeed, whom some of them accuse of being a most profound hypocrite himself, while every, aye every, member of his family, female as well as male, is so corrupt in heart and so loathsome in carcass, as to be fit for little else than to be thrown to the dung-hill.—Buonaparté's people never describe, in this way, our sovereign and his family;—or, I have missed the descriptions; but, ought not our jubilee people to be cautious how they thus describe a sovereign, whom so many cities and nations seem resolved to honour with public rejoicings? Surely those who live under a man's sway must know him best? The people at Paris must know the Emperor Napoleon better than we can know him. They may have a taste different from ours; but, then, observe, our taste is as different from theirs. Our people think it strange, that the French can like such a sovereign as Napoleon; but, our people should not forget, that it is possible, that the French may think it as strange, that

we should like such a sovereign as George the Third. In short, seeing that the French are our enemies, and are likely to continue such, I think we act very imprudently in goading them in this way about their "state of slavery." It appears to me, that our wise way would be to let them remain in ignorance of the great blessings, which we exclusively enjoy, and which, hitherto, they have not seemed disposed to envy us. Why should we fret ourselves about their slavery? Let them be slaves, if they choose it, so long as we remain so free and so happy.—It is peculiarly unfortunate, too, that these "wretched slaves" should be, as it were out of mere spite, making *jubilees* all over the Empire, and *praising God* for preserving the life, and prolonging the reign, of the man, who, as our people assert, rules them with a rod of iron, and robs them almost of the necessities of life. In answer to this, our jubilee people tell us, that these indications of love and gratitude are *not sincere*; that the people, the *real people*, of France, Austria, Spain, Italy, Poland, &c. &c. hate him and his authority, and every limb and branch and shoot and bud of his debauched and corrupted family, than which, as is asserted, there is not, in all history, ancient or modern, an instance of any one family, in any nation, or in any rank of life, more completely void of every thing like principle, whether of morality or of honour; and, that, of course, so far from rejoicing, and praising God, for his existence, they would, if left to their own will, if unrestrained by the innumerable troops that every where have a bayonet pointed at their breasts, put up public prayers for his extermination, lest, by any accident, his race should be multiplied.—Now, though this answer may do very well with men, assembled over the bottle, and particularly with such as are able to bear the verses of the pensioned poet, *Fitzgerald*, yet, I am afraid, that persons, who take time to reflect, will not be so easily satisfied with this answer; or, if they

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should, I am afraid they will be led to draw therefrom conclusions unfavourable to the motives of our jubilee people; because, if it be a fact well established, and unequivocally acknowledged, that, in several other countries of Europe, the people do make bonfires, dance, illuminate their houses, drink, gorge, and sing anthems, in honour of a man, whom they wish at the devil, we come to this dilemma, either to allow, that there may be a doubt of the sincerity of our jubilee, or that, the people of all those countries (*all the Continent*, indeed) are a set of despicable wretches, and, of course, not at all likely "to assist," as Pitt used to call it, "in their own deliverance."—The Jubilee discussions, in the London Common Council, have been very interesting, and cannot fail, in due time, to produce a good effect. The proposition to hold a jubilee has given rise to remarks upon the occurrences of the last 50 years; it has caused some to be informed of what they never heard of before, and some to be reminded of what they had forgotten. After having, as they thought, carried a measure, intended to set the example of boozing and gormandizing and carousing all over the country, drowning the senses and recollection of the nation in toasting and cheering and hallooing, the movers of this measure, though not much subject to blushing, have been driven to abandon it, and, instead of going to a *tavern*, they have agreed to go to *church*, instead of a *drunk*, they have agreed to have a *thanksgiving*.—But, this is a trifle compared to what has been gained in another way. These discussions have, it is to be hoped, most clearly pointed out to the *Livery of London* the importance of their right to elect the members of their *Common-Council*; but, of this I shall say more in my next; and, in the meanwhile, I beg leave to recommend to the reader a careful perusal of what passed at the last City meeting, and which, if I have room for it, shall be inserted in another part of this Number.

PISTOLLING PRIVY COUNSELLORS.—In my last, I stated the substance of the complaint of Lord Castlereagh against Mr. Canning; but, now we have, through the news-papers, this complaint stated in the Lord's own words. This, and the like of it, are most valuable documents; they are precious memorials of the conduct and character of our "statesmen;" of these servants of the king; these men, who had on their side a majority of the

House of Commons; these far-famed Anti-Jacobins; these tangible-shape-men; these life-and-fortune and holy-altar men; these men, who made war for the support of the dignity of government, for social order, and "our holy religion;" these valorous stand-makers against popular encroachment; these defenders of the House of Brunswick against a Jacobinical Conspiracy.—Come, then, let us have their mutual accusations: let us hear what they say one of the other; let us put their characters upon record in their own words.

"*St. James's-square, 19th Sept. 1809.*

"SIR,—It is unnecessary for me to enter into any detailed statement of the circumstances which preceded the recent resignations.—It is enough for me, with a view to the immediate object of this letter, to state, that it appears a proposition had been agitated, without any communication with me, for my removal from the War Department; and that you, towards the close of the last Session, having urged a decision upon this question, with the alternative of your seceding from the government, procured a positive promise from the Duke of Portland (the execution of which you afterwards considered yourself entitled to enforce), that such removal should be carried into effect. Notwithstanding this promise, by which I consider you pronounced it unfit that I should remain charged with the conduct of the War, and by which my situation as a Minister of the crown was made dependent upon your will and pleasure, you continued to sit in the same Cabinet with me, and to leave me not only in the persuasion that I possessed your confidence and support as a colleague, but you allowed me, in breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private, though thus virtually superseded, to originate and proceed in the execution of a new enterprise of the most arduous and important nature, with your apparent concurrence, and ostensible approbation.—You were fully aware that if my situation in the Government had been disclosed to me, I could not have submitted to remain one moment in office, without the entire abandonment of my private honour, and public duty. You knew I was deceived, and you continued to deceive me.—I am aware, it may be said, which I am ready to ac-

"knowledge, that when you pressed for a
 "decision for my removal, you also
 "pressed for its disclosure, and that it
 "was resisted by the Duke of Portland, and
 "some members of the Government sup-
 "posed to be my friends. But I never can
 "admit, that you have a right to make use
 "of such a plea, in justification of an act
 "affecting my honour, nor that the senti-
 "ments of others could justify an acquies-
 "cence in such a delusion on your part,
 "who had yourself felt and stated its un-
 "fairness. Nor can I admit that the head
 "of any administration, or any supposed
 "friend (whatever may be their motives),
 "can authorize or sanction any man in
 "such a course of long and persevering
 "deception. For were I to admit such a
 "principle, my honour and character
 "would be from that moment in the dis-
 "cretion of persons wholly unauthorised,
 "and known to you to be unauthorised, to
 "act for me in such a case. It was there-
 "fore your act and your conduct which de-
 "ceived me; and it is impossible for me
 "to acquiesce in being placed in a situa-
 "tion by you, which no man of honour
 "could knowingly submit to, nor patient-
 "ly suffer himself to be betrayed into,
 "without forfeiting that character.—I
 "have no right, as a public man, to resent
 "your demanding upon public grounds,
 "my removal from the particular office
 "I have held, or even from the Ad-
 "ministration, as a condition of your con-
 "tinuing a Member of the Government.
 "But I have a distinct right to expect that
 "a proposition, justifiable in itself, shall
 "not be executed in an unjustifiable man-
 "ner, and at the expence of my honour
 "and reputation. And I consider that
 "you were bound, at least, to avail your-
 "self of the same alternative, namely,
 "your own resignation, to take yourself
 "out of the predicament of practising such a
 "deceit towards me, which you did exer-
 "cise in demanding a decision for my re-
 "moval.—Under these circumstances, I
 "must require that *satisfaction* from you to
 "which I feel myself entitled to lay
 "claim. I am, &c.

CASTLEREAGH."

The Right Hon. George Canning.

Gloucester-Lodge, Sept. 20, 1809.

"MY LORD,—The tone and purport of
 "your Lordship's letter, which I have this
 "moment received, of course preclude any
 "other answer on my part to the misap-
 "prehensions and misrepresentations with

"which it abounds, than that I will cheer-
 "fully give to your Lordship the satisfac-
 "tion which you require. I am, &c.

GEORGE CANNING."

Lord Viscount Castlereagh, &c. &c.

Before I proceed to remark upon the nature of the facts, as thus authentically stated, I cannot help asking the reader, whether he believes, that a person, who would write such a letter as that of Lord Castlereagh, would, by any merchant in London, be taken into his counting-house, at 150 pounds a year.—I take these letters from the news-papers, and, as articles there found, I publish them; but, really, it can scarcely be believed, that a man, through whose hands so much of letter-writing must have passed, should have penned any thing so completely confused. At last, indeed, one gets at the meaning; but, in what way *must* affairs be understood, if left to such hands?—The meaning, however, appears to be this, that Mr. Canning was guilty of "*a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private*;" that he knew Lord Castlereagh to be deceived, and that he "*continued to deceive him*;" that he pursued a long course of "*persevering deception*;" and that, therefore, Lord Castlereagh demands satisfaction of him.—Now, it is not we, Jacobins, who say these things of Mr. Canning, who reviled us as conspirators. If the letters be authentic, it is Lord Castlereagh; it is his colleague; it is his brother Pittite; it is his yoke mate; it is the man, at the very close of the last session of parliament, he called his "*noble friend*." This is the man, under whose hand and seal his character is now given to the world.—I, for my part, care not one straw, whether the facts, stated in this letter, be true or false. Not a single straw do I care; but, this nobody can deny, that, unless the facts be true, the accuser is a very impudent liar.—To be sure, if the facts be true, a point which, I repeat, I care nothing about; but, if they be true, what a pretty figure does Mr. Canning make? He demands that Lord Castlereagh shall be removed from his office, and makes this a condition of his remaining in the ministry himself; and yet, he sits in the same cabinet with him long afterwards, and suffers him to plan and execute measures of a magnitude unparalleled in the history of this long and perilous war. All this time, even after he has obtained a positive promise that Lord

Castlereagh shall be put out of office, he says not a word to Lord Castlereagh upon the subject; never expresses, to his face, any objection to him; works against him, behind his back, in the manner the most effectual; and, what is worse than all the rest, suffers the management of the war to remain in his hands, sees him fit out an expedition of enormous expence, while it was next to impossible that he (Mr. Canning) could wish that expedition success.

—The remark always to be made, upon these occasions, is, that we, Jacobins, have had no hand in the matter. It is not we who say these things of Mr. Canning; it was not we who obtained a promise for the turning out of Lord Castlereagh, nor did we ever call him our "noble friend;" we had nothing to do with the Walcheren expedition, or with the Talavera campaign; we have laid on none of the taxes, nor made any of the treaties. The whole of the nation's concerns have, from the beginning of debt and war to the present day, been in the hands of the "loyal," in the hands of those who call us mob and traitors. Well, then, if these concerns be in a bad way, find not fault with us; if the country be in a state of peril, and if it be, at last, become a question, whether England be able to preserve herself against the attacks of France, let the nation blame others than the Jacobins for what has happened; for, it is notorious, that she has fallen into this state, while her pecuniary and personal resources have all been at the absolute disposal of those, who have constantly decried the principles and views of the Jacobins.—For about sixteen years, there has been going on a regular attack, on the part of the people in place, upon a certain description of persons, to whom, because it was become very hateful, they gave the name of Jacobins, and this name they have invariably given to every man, who has dared to complain of their doings. Owing to various causes, the trick has succeeded; and, though it now deceives but few people, the *Anti-jacobins*, or, the *loyal*, have constantly beaten the Jacobins, have kept all the power amongst themselves, and have, in all cases, acted in *direct and studied opposition* to the well-known and clearly-expressed wishes of the Jacobins. They have beaten us; they have had their will; their principles have triumphed over ours. Nothing, therefore, can be more just, or more reasonable, than for us to disown the concern; and, if the nation begins to feel, at last, to request it to look for an account

to the Anti-Jacobins. We have had nothing at all to do with the matter. It is to our revilers that the nation, whom, for my part, I do not pity, has to look. We care not any thing about the old disputes: we will not begin the discussion anew: this is the point; that you have had *your will*: you have done just what you pleased: are the people satisfied with the result? If they be, much good may it do them; and, if they be not, on you let them throw the blame; to the Anti-jacobins let them look for a reason why they now suffer, and why they expect further sufferings.

TALAVERA'S CAMPAIGN.—After the publication of the substance of the General Order, said to have been issued at Lisbon *against the circulating of bad news*, it would be foolish in any one to expect any but *good news* from that quarter. Now, we get no news; and, as the saying is, *no news is good news*. I have, indeed, before me, a letter from an officer in my Lord Douro's army which contains some particulars worth knowing, and which particulars I shall here state, only observing, that I know the writer very well, and that I have not the smallest doubt of the truth of the statement.—The letter is dated on the 18th of August, in the Camp near Truxillo.—"You must," says the writer, "long 'ere this, have had a more correct account of the circumstances attending the battle of Talavera, than it is in my power to give. On the 1st of August, our wounded were not all taken off the field, and, when we left Talavera, they were putting the dead bodies in heaps, and **BURNING them.** * * * * *"
" * * * * * The sick of the army amounts to nearly eight thousand men. Our effective strength to between six and seven thousand. The light brigade, which left England last, has suffered more than any of the army. Four of the officers of the 43rd died within the last two days, and they have now twenty-six sick in that regiment. The men of the different regiments, composing that brigade, are in a dreadful state. The greater part of our wounded and sick were taken by the French, at Placencia, Aropeza, and Talavera; but, the French are reported to be taking the greatest care of them.—Our march from Aropeza to this place was severe, the troops having only half a pound of bread and the same quantity of flour a day, to subsist on during seven days, the weather dreadfully hot, and very little water.

“ * * * * * Provi-
 “ sions are very expensive. The quantity
 “ of sour wine and bread, sufficient to
 “ keep a man alive, for twenty-four hours,
 “ cannot be procured under two or three
 “ dollars. General * * * * * I am happy
 “ to inform you, is quite well. For my own
 “ part, I am neither well nor ill; but, I
 “ am certain, I should be much better, had
 “ I a little more to eat.—P. S. The
 “ whole of the ammunition is ordered to be des-
 “ troyed this evening. I have just received
 “ orders to get ready to march to-mor-
 “ row.”—The gentleman, who writes
 this, is not a man to exaggerate either dis-
 tresses or dangers. What a pretty situa-
 tion, then, must this army of *deliverers* have
 been in? A pound of bread, or flour, is not
 enough to keep a man alive upon a march;
 and, besides, how was the flour to be
 cooked? Only think of the number of poor
 creatures, who must have dropped by the
 way, during those seven dreadful days of
 march; and, think of the *expence*, when,
 to keep a man alive for twenty-four hours,
 the food cost *two dollars*, at least!—Such,
 Englishmen, is the war, which the Anti-
 Jacobins are carrying on for Ferdinand
 VII. and the ancient order of things, or, as
 the pastry-cook orator had it, for the
 “ *holy altars*” of Spain. Such is the war,
 the object of which was first proclaimed by
 Mr. Canning, at the London Tavern, amidst
 the loud plaudits of the Jews, Contrac-
 tors, Jobbers, and Makers of Paper-Money.
 Such is the war, the object of which I
 always reprobated, and which reprobation,
 the hireling prints asserted, arose
 from “ the *direct instigation of the devil*.”
 —Here is another of the feats of the
 Anti-Jacobins; here is another of their ex-
 ploits; here is another of those *blessings*, for
 which they bid us be thankful. Verily,
 it is the nation's fault; for, had the na-
 tion possessed either sense or spirit, things
 never could have come to this pass. Will
 it be believed, hereafter, that, after the
 fate of Sir John Moore and his army;
 after the woful experience, which they
 had of the disposition of the people of
 Spain; of their total indifference as to
 which party triumphed; and of the in-
 evitable consequence of penetrating into
 the heart of Spain; will it be believed,
 that, with all this before their eyes, the
 same ministers should send more troops on
 the same errand, and that a general should
 be found to expose his army in the same
 manner?—Being upon this topic, I can-
 not help noticing a curious passage in the

Morning Chronicle of the 10th instant,
 relative to the conduct of my Lord of Tala-
 vera, whom, as the reader will recollect,
 this same Morning Chronicle did, not
 many weeks ago, and since the battle of
 Talavera, place “ *in the very FIRST RANK*
 “ *of British heroes*.”—His tone is now
 changed, and he says: “ Our expedition
 “ to Spain, in a moment apparently the
 “ *most auspicious, when the necessities of the*
 “ *French Emperor had forced him almost to*
 “ *abandon the Peninsula*, has ended only in
 “ the dear-bought glory of a single battle.
 “ Our gallant General took it into his head
 “ to imitate, as he conceived, the example of
 “ the great Captain of the Age; and be-
 “ cause, in several instances, Napoleon
 “ had conquered by the rapidity of his
 “ movements, *thought that nothing was want-*
 “ *ing to success but rapidity*. Lord Wel-
 “ lington either *had not the judgment*, or he
 “ did not give himself the time to discrimi-
 “ nate between the situations in which
 “ Buonaparté had been quick, and those
 “ in which he had been slow in his opera-
 “ tions. If he had allowed himself time,
 “ *even for recollection*, he would have seen
 “ that that consummate warrior decided
 “ on his line of conduct in every instance
 “ on its own peculiar circumstances.
 “ When he had to attack an enemy like
 “ the Austrians, where preparation had
 “ been made to receive him, he viewed
 “ their enemies magazines as collected for
 “ his use; and regardless of all the maxims
 “ of ancient warfare, by an extraordinary
 “ effort of seemingly desperate rashness,
 “ he threw himself into the country of his
 “ opponent, and seized on the stores of the
 “ enemy for his own subsistence.—But not
 “ so when he entered the peninsula of
 “ Spain.—He was well aware that he
 “ could find no magazines, no stores, no
 “ provision in a country which had been
 “ so long subjected to a government of
 “ superstition and ignorance, and accord-
 “ ingly before he entered Spain with his
 “ army, he had occupied nine months in
 “ preparing his provision, and providing
 “ the means of its conveyance. The con-
 “ trast is lamentable. The testimony of
 “ every officer in Lord Wellington's army,
 “ who has communicated with his friends,
 “ *is against the line of conduct which he pur-*
 “ *sued*. He thought only of rapidity, and
 “ not of subsistence. He hurried on, out-
 “ stripped his Commissariat, forced himself
 “ into a predicament from which he could
 “ not escape without fighting, and in
 “ which he could reap nothing but honour

"by the sacrifice of one fourth of his followers."—And this man, *after* his advance to Talavera, was, by this same print, this same Morning Chronicle, placed "in the very first rank of British heroes!"

—What is the cause of this change? Why, an opinion newly entertained by the editor of the Morning Chronicle, that the Wellesley family will join with Mr. PERCEVAL, and so keep his friends and himself out of place and out of the receipt of the public money. This is the reason, and the only reason, of this change of language. Now, therefore, the Wellesleys are to be pulled down as much as possible. Oh! these are miserable politics, Mr. Perry. Really it were far better for you to hire out the *whole* of your columns in a sort of backbiting advertisements and paragraphs against individuals, whom you envy, than to endeavour with practices like these to keep up the show, the mockery, of public writing.—In quitting, for the present, this subject of the Talavera Campaign, it may not be amiss to notice, that, some days ago, there appeared in the London news-papers, a paragraph, announcing, in very *concise* terms, the arrival of GEORGE FITZ-CLARENCE, Esq. from Spain. Now, I do remember me of a youth of this name, who *went out*, it was said, in the army of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and about whose lion-hearted disposition, whose terrible eagerness to be at the French, a vast deal was said in the news-papers. Does not the reader recollect that he was said to have driven a great many post-horses nearly to death, in order to get to Portsmouth in time? Doubtless, if he be *come home*, business of great importance must have brought him; and therefore, I did expect, that, before now, we should have had some important news communicated to us.—It is very curious to observe what has taken place as to the *Embassy* to Spain. First Mr. Frere, one of the partners in the firm of Anti-Jacobin prose and poetry, was appointed by Mr. Canning, another of the firm, *to represent his majesty*, NEAR the king of Spain, Ferdinand VII, who was safe in France, in one of Napoleon's palaces, where he was at best a *staté* prisoner. This gentleman has been immortalized by a brother of Sir John Moore, who has published a book, in justification of the conduct of the unfortunate general, and in which book Mr. Frere makes a conspicuous figure. Next, Marquis Wellesley is to go, in order to take the place of Mr.

Frere, but with a higher rank; and now, if report be true, he is to come home, and Mr. Frere's brother is to supply his place. —I should like to see the items of charge against this nation for the Spanish Embassy. Good God, what expence!—Oh! but I cannot away with this notion of recalling Marquis Wellesley. This is, I will frankly confess it, a mortification that I shall scarcely survive. What! bring away our Eastern conqueror, before he can well have begun to arrange his plans? He was sent, we were told, to infuse spirit into the Junta, and hardly can he have begun to blow, when he is to be called home again. No, no: he must not come yet. I'll petition the King to be graciously pleased to keep him there, 'till he has measured his strength with Buonaparté. Have not the wise men, who write in the Morning Post and the Courier, always told us, that the Marquis was the only man to match Buonaparté? Why not let him remain, then, in a place where he will have a fair chance of giving effect to our long-entertained wishes?—This recal of the Marquis, if true, is a very grievous thing. *The Marquis went out when Buonaparté was said to have been defeated at Aspern*; and, shall it be said, that he comes home now, when Buonaparté may be expected to *return speedily to Spain*? Oh, no! For the world I would not have the noble Marquis come back, till the contest in Spain is completely decided. I think, too, that, under the present circumstances, he will not come back. Let us, however, keep our eye upon the Peninsula, and see what *moves* are made. There is little fear but things will go well at last, if we do but observe narrowly, and *bear in mind* what we observe, not suffering our attention to be drawn off by Theatre-rows, or by the toasting, and boozing and canting of the Jews and Contractors.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.—That his Majesty's own portrait, stamped on gold too, and in a year of *jubilee*, should be concerned in a conspiracy against him and his government, would be a thing not to be believed, if it was not so positively asserted by so many credible witnesses.—The hired news-papers do, indeed, throw the blame, not upon the guineas, but upon those who buy them up, whether to *hoard* or to *export*. This will not do. It is the guineas themselves that are to blame, if any one is, for their retreat from circulation. They will not stay to circulate amongst so much dirty, ill-looking, worthless paper. None

of your imputations against us Jacobins of flesh and blood, therefore. If there be jacobinism at the bottom of the evil, it is in the guineas themselves and not in us. To be sure, I must, for myself, confess, that I wish success to the guineas; that I wish them to beat the nasty mashed rags; that I wish to see some of the thousands upon thousands of those who are gulling the public, and, in fact, cheating them, reduced to follow some honest occupation; but I never will allow, that we Jacobins have had any hand in this any more than in the war-matters. The "*great-man-now-no-more*;" that object of the joint praises of Lord Grenville and Lord Grey; he, whose debts we were taxed to pay; he, whom to bury and to raise a monument to whose memory we were taxed; aye, that was the man, the *grand financier*, who managed all the banking affairs, who caused the bank notes to be made virtually a legal tender; aye, that was he; it was that "great man," who, at once, put down jacobins and made "*a war of finance*" upon the French. Do not blame us, then, for these jacobin tricks of the guineas. It was he, to whose memory the worthies of the short parliament compelled us to pay for the building of a monument: it was he who inundated the country with paper.—Aye, it was that idol of the Jews, jobbers, and loan-mongers; it was he, who, a hundred times, declared, in the House of Commons, that the war with the French was *a mere war of finance*! Aye, it was he (oh, that he was still on earth!) who, year after year, promised this deluded nation, that the French were just upon the point of being *ruined*; nay, who told us, that they were *ruined, beggared, and starving*—Good heavens! Look back, reader, to the date of those empty, those shallow-pated predictions, and look at what now is. The Anti-jacobin Pitt and his Anti-jacobin followers had their will; they persecuted, they put down, they silenced their opponents at home; they have, even until now, done what they pleased with all the resources of the nation: And, lo! that France, that very France, which, in the year 1795, they said was *ruined*, is now the mistress of Europe; that France, which, even at a later period, they had prepared plans for parcelling out, now has assumed such an attitude, has, during their unceasing hostility, arrived at such a pitch of greatness and of physical strength, as to make it matter of *boast* with these her former menacers, that she has not yet subdued

England!—It was a war of *finance* that Pitt waged, and a war of *starvation*. Europe cannot have forgotten his measures for preventing provisions from going to France, in a time of dreadful scarcity; nor can they have forgotten the *forging of assignats* in London, under the authority of the government, and sending them to France, in order to ruin the finances of that country. Well, what is the result of this "great man's" war against the *purse* and the *belly* of the French? What is the result? Why, we are now *endeavouring to obtain corn from France*; and, while our current coin flees the society of our countless millions of paper-money, France abounds in gold and silver, and knows none of the evils of a paper-currency; and, which is a very curious fact, I am credibly informed, that a great quantity of Louis d'ors, or Napoleon d'ors, were purchased by us in the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, in order to be sent out on the Walcheren Expedition!—Such, thus far; has been the result of the Pitt "*war of finance*." And, yet, do we find people so foolish, or so impudent, as to assert, that this was a great statesman. They will, in all human probability, suffer for his having had authority; and, I say, *let them suffer*; for, it is next to impossible, that people so wilfully blind, or so basely bent, should suffer more than they deserve.—The subject of astonishment is, how any man can be found with impudence sufficient to pretend to believe, that that was "a great man," who so managed the affairs of this nation; who so used its resources, of all sorts, as to render it, at least, a mere petty state in comparison with its ancient rival. But, again, I say, suffer for it they will; and, again, I say, let them suffer.—To return more immediately to the subject of *Jacobin Guineas*, I have no scruple in saying, that I think it a subject of *more importance* than any other; and, for this reason, that, as long as the present system of paper-money-making lasts, so long will last the abuses and corruptions which are eating out the vitals of the country. Viewing the subject in this light, I cannot help endeavouring to correct the errors of others, who write upon the subject; or, at any rate, what I deem errors. With this object in view, I here insert a letter, published, the other day, in the Morning Chronicle news-paper, signed L, which letter, as far as it goes to prove the *depreciation of bank notes*, is not only unexceptionable, but is excellent; but, when it

comes to speak of a *remedy*; of the bank's keeping its issues of notes *within due bounds*, he does not, I am sure, foresee the consequences of what he recommends. —The letter is rather long, but every word of it is well worthy of the attention of every father, mother, guardian, and of every one, who thinks of acquiring funded property. —“A writer in your Paper, under the signature of A. Z. acknowledges, that to purchase a pound weight of gold you must pay in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*, while the mint or standard price of the same commodity is no more than 46*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.*, and yet he says that Bank notes are not at a discount. I am of a contrary opinion, and the fact as stated above, and which is admitted by A. Z. is of itself sufficient to prove it. —A pound of gold is equal in weight with 44 guineas and a half, and when taken to the mint, will coin into that number, this pound of gold will cost in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*, and when coined into guineas it passes for only 46*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.*; does not this furnish a proof that our currency is depreciated? It certainly does; and, at the same time, it presents to our view the quantum of its depreciation, which, upon 55*l.* 16*s.*, is 9*l.* 1*s.* 6*d.* —The truth of this position may be proved by any one who will purchase a pound of gold bullion, for which he must pay in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*; let him take that pound of bullion to the Mint to be coined into guineas, he will have returned to him 44 guineas and a half; they will weigh exactly a pound. Now let us see what these 44 guineas and a half are worth as currency in the purchase of goods; they will pass for no more than 46*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.*, though the gold from which they were coined cost in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*; is not this a proof that Bank notes are depreciated? That they are at a discount? Again, let the same 44 guineas and a half be melted, and turned once more into bullion, they will instantly recover their former value with respect to currency, and will sell or exchange for 55*l.* 16*s.* in that depreciated medium. The same experiment may be tried upon a smaller scale; buy one ounce of gold bullion, for which you must pay in Bank notes 4*l.* 13*s.*; take the said ounce to the Mint and it will coin into 3*l.* 17*s.* 10½*d.*; by this operation you will sustain a loss of 15*s.* 1½*d.*, which sum is the depreciation of currency, both in coin and Bank notes, or, to use other terms,

“it is the discount on 4*l.* 13*s.* in currency, compared with bullion. —“Gold in bullion is the currency of the whole mercantile world, therefore it is not in the power of any particular Government to fix the limits of its price, which, for that reason, will always preserve its true and just value—whereas gold in coin is the creature and child of every particular Government, over which it has absolute power and controul, and the current value of which, by various expedients, it can raise or sink at pleasure, as is proved by the financial history of every country in Europe; therefore, gold in coin, viz. in guineas, is no standard at all whereby to measure the true value of Bank notes, and it was a want of attention to this very important point, which betrayed your correspondent A. Z. into an error, when he concluded, that, because guineas and Bank notes are of equal value in currency, therefore Bank notes are not at a discount. —It is true that a pound note and a shilling will buy as much of any commodity as a guinea, hence many have inferred with A. Z. that Bank notes are not at a discount, this inference is at first sight plausible, therefore calculated to delude the unthinking; but if it be tried by the touch-stone of truth, it vanishes in a moment, and we discover the plain and naked fact to be this—that the Bank-note is positively depreciated; that this depreciation has communicated itself to the guinea, consequently they are both in a state of depreciation. The great quantity of Bank notes in circulation has degraded them in value, and they, in their turn, have brought down to their own level the small quantity of coin: the market is glutted with Bank notes, whereby they are depreciated, and, in their fall, they have carried down the guineas along with them; but this lamentable effect could not have been produced without the co-operation of two powerful causes.—First, the law has made it felony, to melt the coin of the realm; therefore, though it may be done to a very great profit, and, for that reason, a tradesman may sell his goods cheaper for guineas, than for Bank notes, and reimburse himself by melting the guineas, and selling them as bullion, yet he is deterred by the severity of the law, he dares not make two distinct prices, because it would demonstrate, that he intended to melt the guineas, and thereby commit felony,

"in which he would instantly lose his character,
 "and would probably be ruined.—Secondly,
 "the law, though not in express terms,
 "yet virtually, has made Bank notes a
 "legal tender. If a man owe you 20 guineas,
 "he may tender you 21*l.* in Bank notes,
 "and should you refuse to accept them in
 "discharge of the debt, you are not allow-
 "ed to arrest him. Thus Bank notes are
 "become a legal tender, which is equiva-
 "lent to enacting a law that no difference
 "shall be made in current value between
 "guineas and Bank notes. The intention
 "of that law was to prevent the deprecia-
 "tion of Bank notes, by keeping up their
 "value to a level with that of guineas, and
 "so long as the quantity of Bank notes in
 "circulation *was kept within proper bounds*,
 "there was no depreciation; but as soon
 "as Bank notes were sent into circulation,
 "in greater quantities than the trade of
 "the country required, the market became
 "overstocked with them, and they sunk in
 "value, and in this state of things it was
 "impossible to prevent their depreciation:
 "but the power of the law had put them
 "upon a level with guineas, and ordered
 "that they should remain so: it therefore
 "followed of course, that the depreciation
 "of the one was the depreciation of the
 "other, for the law having bound them
 "together, Bank notes sinking in value,
 "*carried down the guineas with them*; by
 "these means the whole currency of the
 "kingdom, consisting of a great quantity
 "of Bank notes and a small quantity of
 "guineas, became equally depreciated.—
 "To prove the truth of this statement, let
 "these two laws be repealed, and leave
 "guineas, like other things, to find their
 "value unconnected and unfettered with
 "Bank notes, and what would be the con-
 "sequence? They would instantly sepa-
 "rate from coin, and have a distinct value.
 "Guineas would then be estimated as bul-
 "lion, two prices would be made in every
 "commodity; one for bullion, the other
 "for Bank notes; and should the dif-
 "ference be from 16 to 17 per cent., which
 "is about the present proportion, it would
 "follow, that Bank notes would pass in the
 "market at 16 to 17 per cent. discount,
 "and that in purchasing goods, a Bank
 "note of a pound would pass for no more
 "than about 16*s.* 8*d.* sterling. This is in
 "reality about the price for which they
 "now pass, though the fact is concealed
 "and hidden from the unscrutinizing eye,
 "because by the violence of law, *guineas*
 "*have been degraded along with Bank notes,*

"and the degradation being common to
 "both, it is not to be discovered by com-
 "parison. The only way to prove the
 "fact, is, by referring to the true stand-
 "ard, gold in bullion.—The general de-
 "preciation of currency, is to be dis-
 "tinctly seen in the rapid increase of
 "prices, that within a short time has
 "taken place in all these commodities
 "which are purchased with our circulat-
 "ating medium. The same crisis which
 "seems to be now coming on in this coun-
 "try, took place in France; when assig-
 "nats, being issued in too great abundance,
 "depreciated, so as almost to lose their
 "value, and the *horrible result* must be
 "fresh in the recollection of every one.
 "Should the depreciation or discount on
 "Bank Notes continue to increase, there
 "is no knowing to what height the prices
 "of all the necessaries and conveniences
 "of life may attain, and with what weight
 "the pressure may fall upon the public;
 "they may rise so high as to become al-
 "*most unattainable, except by the rich*, and the
 "consequences may be dreadful.—If then
 "we are threatened with such horrible
 "calamities, *why is not a remedy instantly*
 "*applied?* Why do not the Bank Direc-
 "tors keep the issue of their notes *within*
 "*due bounds?* And, if they are not so
 "disposed, *why do not Government com-*
 "*pel them?* Or, why does not our Go-
 "vernment order them, as formerly, to
 "pay their notes in cash? For then they
 "could not keep in circulation more than
 "the commerce of the country required,
 "their notes would always be at par with
 "bullion, and the high prices of commo-
 "dities would return to their former level;
 "but the Bank Directors may have mo-
 "tives which induce them to overstock
 "the market with their paper; the more
 "notes they can keep out, the greater
 "their profits; the greater their profits,
 "the more they can divide in the shape
 "of interest and bonus; and the more
 "they divide, the higher will be the price
 "of their stock. This accounts for the
 "late enormous rise in the price of Bank
 "stock, while the Government funds have
 "continued nearly stationary. By per-
 "sisting in such a system, the Directors
 "of the Bank may, in a short time, raise
 "the price of their stock to 300 per cent,
 "or upwards, and when the temptation to
 "enrich themselves, by raising the price
 "of their own stock, is so very great, and
 "is at the same time completely in their
 "power, may not human frailty, stimu-

"lated by avarice, yield to the temptation."—Upon this letter I have first to remark, that the *proof of depreciation* is very good; that the point is clearly and undeniably established. Yet, I must observe, at the same time, that this point was as clearly made out before, in the Political Register, Volumes IV and V, and VI, and in a very excellent pamphlet, published by Lord King about the same time. Indeed, if the reader will just turn to these Volumes, under the heads of *Finance, Restriction on the Bank, Funds*, and some others, he will find, that the writer of this letter has, without perceiving it, repeated the arguments and many of the illustrations there used in support of the asserted depreciation of bank paper, and especially those in refutation of the plausible argument, that a pound in paper will buy as much goods as a pound in specie.—This point of an actually existing depreciation, is, then, a point settled. No one but a fool, or a knave, will any longer deny the fact. And this being the case, I am rather surprised, that so clear-headed a person, as he who writes this letter, should think it amiss, that the bank-stock holders divide more per cent. than formerly. He should recollect, that what they divide is, like the rest, *depreciated*. I do not know any thing of the names of their trash, which they call property; but, I will suppose, that a man was fool enough to lay out a hundred good pounds in gold upon a thing (call it *Stock*, or what you will) for which the Bank, in the year 1792, used to pay him 5 pounds a year. I shall suppose him to have been fool enough to leave his principal money in the same hands, after Pitt openly declared, that he was making a war of finance; and, for argument's sake, I will beg my countrymen's leave to suppose, that some one amongst them was such a double-skulled wretch as to leave his money still there after the law was passed to exempt the bank from paying their promissory notes; and, supposing all this, it is certain, that, unless the *nominal* amount of this man's dividends were raised, he would in *reality* not receive much more than *half* as much as he received when he first put his money in the bank. To call it the *same sum*, therefore, is stupid; it argues a want of capacity to combine ideas. Yes, sure, five pounds is still five pounds in name, but it is not the *same thing*, it has not the same powers of purchase. For ten years previous to the year 1792, the average price of the quartern loaf was

under seven pence; for the ten years ending with this year, the average price of that loaf will have been nearly about thirteen pence. "Oh!" exclaims some rickety, bandy-legged Jew, or Jew-like Christian, "but that is owing to the *dearness* of bread." Why, yes, Moses, it is so; but, the dearness of bread, Moses, is, in fact, owing to the *cheapness of money*, and that cheapness has been produced by the eternal workings of your mill in Threadneedle Street.—At any rate, reader, you will take hold of this plain fact, that, before 1792, a pound in money would purchase nearly twice as much bread as a pound in money now will, and, of course, our bank stock holder, if his dividend were not nearly doubled, would, in fact, lose nearly one half of his income.—But, now we come to the point that is of great interest to the people at large; and that is this; that, while the bank-stock-holder, who is, in fact, a partner in the banking house in Threadneedle Street, has his dividends augmented in *nominal* amount, in order to keep pace with the depreciation of money, the man who has his money in what is, drolly enough, called "*The Funds*," obtains *no augmentation* of the nominal amount of his dividends. If, for instance, your father, by will, left you, in the year 1792, a thousand pounds, in "*The Funds*," compelling you to keep it there, you then received as much interest annually as would purchase nearly *twice as much bread* as you can purchase with that same interest now, because the nominal amount of your dividends cannot be augmented, as in the case of bank-stock, where the partners in the concern have the money-mill in their own hands. The fathers or mothers, therefore, who would thus provide for their children now, must be either very ignorant, or most obstinate brutes. Seeing, however, that it is entirely owing to the base credulity of those who adore banks and funds; seeing that all the disgraces and miseries of the nation are, at bottom, owing to this description of baseness, the more these people suffer the better, and there is a consolation in reflecting, that they will be great sufferers.—The author of the Letter before us, in speaking of the *destruction of the paper-money in France*, which arose from its excessive quantity, reminds us of that "*horrible result*." What does he mean by "*horrible*?" I see nothing horrible in the annihilation of a nasty, dirty, debased, currency, priated, like shop-bills, at every corner of

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every town. I see nothing horrible in this, and in the return of gold and silver coin. But, on the contrary, I see something very horrible indeed in the system, which imperceptibly steals away the loaf, bit by bit, from the mouth of the widow and the orphan, and gives it to those, whom Lord Chatham denominated *muck-worms and blood-suckers*. I see something very horrible in that system, and especially when I reflect, that scarcely an assize passes over without sending to the gallows tree some one or more of our fellow creatures, the forfeiture of whose lives are necessary to the support of that system. This system may, indeed, be called "*horrible*;" it was the fatal present that the Whigs and their king gave to England.—Perhaps the writer means to say, that the *bloodshed* in France proceeded from the annihilation of the paper-money. Of this I do not believe one word. There is no reason why it should have produced bloodshed. Robespierre, indeed, and some others, in order to SUPPORT the paper-money, put people to death; but, by the annihilation of the paper neither bloodshed nor confusion was produced; and, my real opinion is, that, if our paper-money was completely annihilated in the space of six days, it would not create either mischief or trouble; but, on the contrary, would be like the removal of a long-endured, painful, alarming, and disgraceful disease. The destruction of the paper-money in America produced no bloodshed, and yet, *all* the currency was paper; and so much was it depreciated, that the *dollar notes*, sixty four of which were printed upon a sheet of paper, were paid away in the *quix*, uncut; and, at last, they would not fetch their worth in blank paper. Well, then, it all vanished, and no confusion at all ensued. The desirable thing is, that the depreciation should be *gradual*; because, then, the most perverse, the most greedy, and the most base, suffer most.—As to the "*remedy*" proposed by this writer, I have before shewn, that the application of it is *impracticable*, and, if practicable, it would be, in the very highest degree, unjust and wicked. This gentleman, with all the evils of a paper-currency before him; full in his sight, would fain find out the means of *renovating* and *perpetuating* that evil. I, now, for my part, like to see the paper money increase in quantity. I like to see new shops set up, new mills erected,

and I thought that I should have split my sides with laughter, when, the other day, I saw, in one of the news-papers, a very pompous description of a *new-invented machine*, by the means of which the Bank in Threadneedle street would be enabled to strike off its notes *with much greater rapidity than heretofore*. Bravo! said I. Tell me his name, and I'll toast the inventor. What a comforting thing this machine must be to those who have their whole income chained in the Funds! What a comforting subject of reflection with thousands of widows and orphans!—Here are the exhibitions for a *Jubilee*. Let the Jews and the Jobbers and the Contractors call forth all these miserable creatures, and march them in procession, together with our million and a quarter of paupers, and let them all be brought and made to kneel down before *Pitt's statue* and this *newly-invented machine*.

I should have added something respecting the Jubilee; but, the following letter has more than anticipated me.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 12th Oct. 1809.

THE JUBILEE.

Alton, Oct. 11, 1809.

SIR;—Having often heard my father expatiate on the happy times at the beginning of the reign of the present king, I have been led to look a little into the price of the Necessaries of Life at that period, and to judge for myself; and though, often as it has been dinned into my ears by the lives-and-fortunes, last-drop-of-blood, and last-shilling men, that nothing was ever half so delightful as living under our glorious and happy constitution, and our beloved king, and existing circumstances, I cannot help thinking that my father was right, and that my neighbours, nay, the great and valuable majority of the nation, who know nothing of the riot and luxury in which their turtle-fed superiors, (as they are called), live, will, after they have perused the subjoined comparative table, agree with me in opinion, that the sons have not half the real comforts, (I am not here speaking of the loss of political rights and comforts), their fathers possessed; but have begun to suffer; are in an actual state of suffering, and will continue to suffer even unto the third and fourth generation, unless there be a speedy, and general, radical Reform of all Abuses in Church and State.—That no reasons may be wanting why the ap-

proaching Accession should not be considered as a memorable æra, I wish to call your, and your readers attention, and to impress on your minds, the state of things when George the second died, when George the third came to the throne, and when he enters into the 50th year of his reign.—I am for marking the day as it ought to be marked.—I would have my table read in every parish church in the kingdom, and by the king's permission printed at the back of the Form of Prayer.—George the second left us, it is true, a debt of about 90 millions. It is now upwards of 600. Since that time we have had 20 years of peace, and 30 years of war. And we have *spent in the last year only*, (of which 70 millions were raised by taxes), more than the national debt was in the year 1760.—Then, see how the poor-rate and paupers, state and parish paupers, have increased. The number of parish poor was then about 280 thousand, and the poor rate about one million 200 thousand pounds.—The number, in the 49th year of the reign of George the third, in that part of the United kingdom called Great Britain, is *upwards of a million*, and the poor rate upwards of *five millions*—both increased, and are still increasing in an equal ratio with the national debt.—But here comes the pinch.—It now costs a labourer in husbandry *ten days labour* to buy a bushel of flour, costing 16s. 8d. taking the average of wages at 10s. per week.—In 1760 it cost him only *five days labour*, the bushel of flour then being only 5s. 10d., and wages 7s. per week. Oh! but say the Jews, and Jubilee-men, and fat-headed contractors, he lives as well as he did heretofore,—the parish makes it up to him; and so it does, as the nation makes it up to you, but he loses his independence, his comfort, and his happiness: his very nose is brought to the grindstone,—while you, Sir Balaam, fare sumptuously every day, gain what he loses, and turn the handle of the grindstone. Luxury and dependence are more cruel scourges than the wars which beget them, whatever the whole crew of bloodsuckers, bloated, three-guinea-gormandizing gluttons, who with *Mawworm* and the rest assembled at Merchant Taylor's Hall on the 25th of October, may think, if they ever think at all, to the contrary.

Comparison of the Price of the common Necessaries of Life in the Years 1760 1809

Wheat per quarter ... £.	2	0	0	5	0	0
Malt, do.	1	8	0	4	0	0
Flour per bushel	0	5	10	0	16	8
Bread per gallon	0	0	8	0	2	4

Bacon per pound	0	0	6	0	1	2
Pork	0	0	4	0	0	2
Butchers Meat	0	0	4	0	0	8
Cheese per pound	0	0	4	0	0	10
Malt per bushel *	0	3	6	0	12	0
Butter per pound	0	0	6	0	1	6
Soft Sugar, do.	0	0	3	0	0	10
Soap and Candles, do. ...	0	0	6	0	1	3
Pair of Men's stout Shoes	0	5	0	0	12	0
Do. Women's	0	3	0	0	7	6

* The Duty is now 4s. 4d. per bushel.

Rejoice, O ye people! Let us throw up our hats, and bawl out toasts and songs.
Yours, &c. Z.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.

Sir;—I beg leave to submit to your consideration some observations on the subject of your essay on Jacobin Guineas, contained in your Political Register of Sept. 23. The importance of the subject of money and exchange merits serious consideration, and requires to be thoroughly discussed, that clear and accurate ideas may be formed of their operation. Perhaps I may have placed the subject in a different point of view from what is generally conceived; at least I wish to contribute my mite towards its elucidation.—There can be no doubt that gold and silver are the best representatives of property, because they are the universal standards of exchange between all countries. But what occasions any medium of exchange or barter, whether of gold, silver, paper, or other commodity, to be possessed of real value? Why, its being the representative of the accumulation of so much capital, concentrated in a small compass, and which can be readily exchanged for any other commodity reckoned of an equivalent value. For instance, a farmer has a load of wheat of five quarters; there is in this article contained so much capital; such as rent, tythes, rates, taxes, seed, manure, ploughing, reaping, threshing, &c. as it has cost the grower to produce this quantity: besides, when it is sold, there must be a profit left to indemnify him for his capital, time, and attention in producing the commodity. Now, suppose he barter his wheat for seed, with his neighbour, for a like quantity. The last farmer's wheat being likewise a representative of the capital, labour, &c. he has expended in growing it, is an equivalent for the other's. So that there is, in this case, no occasion for a medium of exchange to adjust their respective values; but, if the load of wheat be sold for twenty guineas, or twenty-one

pounds, in bank notes, the guineas, or notes, then become the sign, or representative, of the capital and labour expended in producing the wheat. The same may be observed of any other article of manufacture or trade. Likewise a bill of exchange is a sign of the accumulation of so much capital as is specified by the amount; and is of no value, except there are effects, or the sum mentioned can be converted into real property. The guinea, the bank note, or bill of exchange, are considered, in themselves, of little intrinsic value. It is their being the sign and representation of the amount of the accumulation of so much real capital; or, in other words, industry, labour, and profit, as they respectively stand for, that stamps a value on each. As this is the case, it can make no difference as to the security of the property to the buyer or seller, what is the medium the exchange is made by, whether gold, silver, copper, bank notes, bills of exchange, &c. so long as they are respectively convertible to their full value. But, as gold is an universal medium of exchange, and bank notes only local, it is absolutely necessary that the latter should be always convertible into the former for the amount specified to be equally valuable; else a depreciation must take place, the moment they cannot be exchanged for cash, which will shew itself in the advance of the prices of wheat and other commodities. To make this clear, the price of wheat, at the commencement of the late war, in Mr. Pitt's administration, averaged about 14*l.* per load. When new loans and fresh taxes were required to carry on the war, it became necessary, on every additional loan and tax, to coin and issue annually a certain number of new bank notes to the amount of the interest on the loan or money borrowed; and so on, each succeeding year, as more money was wanting, the bank notes progressively increased and accumulated. Whether the notes were made by the bank of England or private banks makes no difference. Let us now see the operation of the funding system and taxation in increasing the quantity of bank paper, diminishing its value, annihilating the circulation of guineas, and increasing the price of every necessary of life, and article of consumption.—I will take as a standard the above average of wheat, viz. 14*l.* per load at the beginning of the late war, and that taxes directly or indirectly have been laid on the farmer to the amount of 4*l.* per load

on the wheat he grows. What is the consequence? If he grew 14 loads of wheat annually, before the additional taxes took place, he must either grow four loads more, or rise the price 4*l.* a load to gain as much as before. For the sake of a statement, say this kingdom grows one million of loads of wheat in a year; instead of 14 millions of pounds in gold or bank notes to effect the exchange, it will require 18 millions to be circulated to answer the same purpose. If we apply this reasoning to every kind of duty, excise, custom, and tax, what an immense value in bank paper is required to circulate all the exchangeable property and revenue of the kingdom. For the more any article is burdened the more nominal money at least it requires to purchase it, and that, added to the original price, make things dear. Now, as each succeeding year of the war has augmented the taxes, continual fresh issues of bank notes became necessary to keep up the exchange of the increased prices of every necessary and luxury of life, and to pay the accumulating interest on the loans. The consequence of which has been, that, as guineas do not increase so fast as bank notes, the latter have driven the former out of circulation.—There is a certain quantity of money necessary for the exchange and circulation of the trade of the whole empire, and there should subsist a mutual balance in value between bills and cash, for them to obtain a like currency together. In what way has the issuing of such immense numbers of bank notes, and the restriction on the bank of England, operated to the depreciation of their notes, and the withdrawing, or rather annihilating the appearance of guineas in circulation? I believe it will be allowed, that, if there was an equal quantity in value of cash and bills in circulation, every note would then have its correspondent value, and might be readily exchanged for cash; but as there is only a certain amount of money necessary to carry on the trade of the kingdom, and supposing there is a sufficiency and an equal value in bills and cash to answer this purpose, what must the natural consequence be of doubling, or quadrupling, the number of notes, and not the cash? Why, to be sure, the guineas become unnecessary, being superseded by the excessive number of notes. The guineas will be hoarded, and not the notes, and soon find their way into bankers, or merchants hands. But as guineas are precious things, and the banker or merchant,

who has ten or twenty thousand of them by him, will not chuse, I should imagine, to let them lay long dormant in his iron chest, but set his wits to work how to turn them to profit, which, if he cannot do at home, he well knows that foreigners are as much enamoured of his majesty's likeness in the shape of a guinea, as natives. There is such a warmth in the colouring, such weight and strength in the composition, that it is next to an impossibility they should resist the temptation of admiring, beholding, and handling the elegant portrait of king George the third, and this propensity we find is indulged in spite of prohibitory laws and penalties on the exportation of guineas.—With respect to the bank of England not continuing to pay their notes in cash, it arose, as I apprehend, from the country being deluged with promissory notes of one kind and another, more than sufficient for the circulation of the kingdom (as specie is of more intrinsic value than paper, arising from its nature, as well as being a universal medium) the consequence was, so long as the immense number of bank notes afloat could be exchanged for cash, a continual run upon the bank for payment, so that if it had continued the payment of cash for its notes, in all probability, before a very long period, the bank would have been drained of every guinea in it; and this demand upon the bank, in my opinion, shews that bank paper was then beginning to be depreciated and the present cause of its value and slow depreciation, arise from the payments of the revenue of the country being made by it. Thus, it become, the representative of real property, taken from the public, to pay the interest of the national debt, and carry on the war.—The effect of the national debt, or immense revenue levied on the nation, has been, and still continues to be, an increase in the price of every commodity; but, when every necessary of life advances, labour advances likewise, and this again advances the article produced, or manufactured; and thus every tax ultimately falls on the consumer; but, as taxes increase, the means of the public must keep pace with them; else they remain unproductive; and, as they are productive, a further advance of every thing takes place; the consequence is, more bank notes are required to keep up the exchange, and a further reduction of their value, in comparison with specie is the consequence.—Although the above observations contain

many well known truisms, yet I thought they might be useful, in order to lay a foundation on which some abler pen might build a further superstructure.—I remain, Sir, your most obedient servant, Tho. BERNARD, *Mitchelmarsh*, Sept. 28, 1809.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

To the Author of "An Impartial Examination of Sir F. Burdett's Plan of Parliamentary Reform," published by Bone and Hone.

Enfield, 31st August, 1809.

Sir;—The tenour of your "Examination" evincing your respect for the liberties of your country, that respect on your part will, I trust, insure me your thanks, if I shall convince you that, in one very important particular, you have not only misconceived the meaning of the baronet, but have likewise misunderstood a fundamental principle of the English government.—It appears, Sir, from pp. 9, 14, 22, &c. you take for granted that a parliament of "constitutional duration" must be a triennial parliament; which I am inclined to believe is not the opinion of sir F. Burdett; as I trust I shall convince you, that it is not consistent with the constitution.—Had we, Sir, in politics, as we have in religion, a written covenant or testament, a simple reference might in a moment decide this question: But, denied such aid, we must, in the first place, endeavour to ascertain, by definition and facts, what the constitution is; and then refer to it for a decision. The constitution then may be defined to be, 'Certain points of national agreement touching civil government, and those principles on which the security of our natural rights depends.' Respecting points of national agreement, I shall go no further than merely to notice, that, for the originating of laws, the nation has agreed on a legislature of king, lords, and commons; and, for the application of laws, on trial by jury; in one of which the law is made, and in the other administered, by representatives; whence it appears that representation is the great leading principle of our polity.

Parliamentary Representation and Political Liberty are convertible terms: But Representation is far less a personal than a social right: And it has relation, not only to a constituent body of electors, but likewise to time. No individual freeholder can properly declare: 'I elected

'A. B. member for the county; and therefore he is my representative.' But the collective body may correctly say, 'We choose him; and therefore he is our representative.'

Then again, when we speak of the freeholders of Middlesex, or other county, as a constituent body, there are two distinct senses in which we may use the phrase; for we may either mean the freeholders who at the time or period of speaking compose the body, or we may mean the body politic of the county as a permanent community, without reference to the individuals who at the time or period of speaking happen to compose that body. But it must be apparent that the freeholders who, at the period of an election, shall have a right to choose a person to represent their county, cannot, by virtue of that election, confer on the chosen person a right of representing a succeeding generation of the freeholders. In the nature of things, there must therefore be some limit in point of time, or duration, to the authority of parliamentary representatives.—How, Sir, shall we arrive at a correct idea of this limit? Shall we, like too many, put entirely out of our consideration the constitution, and prescribe a limit according to our own fancy or judgment? Surely not! Such limit cannot be thought to depend on any imagined expediency in the opinion of this, or of that man; but must be founded on some principle of free government. Not, Sir, that expediency is to be wholly disregarded: no; it is to be duly, but not exclusively considered; so that it may go hand in hand with justice and liberty.

With reference then to expediency, we ought to remember, that we are subject to seasons which yearly run their course, and dependent on the earth for yearly bread. Hence it is found expedient, yearly to till that earth; yearly to regulate human concerns, public as well as private; yearly to legislate, yearly to tax, yearly to settle accounts. We in this country also know, that such is become the magnitude of the national business, a considerable portion of every year is required for the labours of legislation. Hence we are taught that, for being provided against all contingents, the duration of parliamentary power ought not to be much, if any thing, short of a year; while we must know there could be no use, but might be great danger, if it were to be longer continued, as the faithful representative might, and

naturally would be, repeatedly re-elected, it could not be even expedient, that he should hold his office beyond the term of one year: and if he became unfaithful, it were a monstrous doctrine, that he should nevertheless continue to represent a community he betrayed. So far therefore as expediency is concerned, it is clearly in favour of annual parliaments.

Let us now examine the claims of Principle, that is, of justice and political liberty. Man's age being universally reckoned by the revolution of the seasons, or years; and every one entering upon his inheritance, equally in property and in political liberty, or his elective franchise, as soon as the period of his infancy or minority has expired; it is evident that any practice which militates against this right, and prevents this enjoyment, must be contrary to the constitution; or to 'those principles on which the security of our natural rights depends.' If the principle of duration be violated, then, whether a parliament have continuance for 3 years or for 7, for 17 or for 70, the violation is alike unjust; and all the difference will only be, in the degree of injustice. For when a parliament hath continuance beyond one year, then all those thousands of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or tens of thousands, (as the case may be) who, since the last preceding election, have attained the legal age for inheriting their elective franchise, and entering into the full enjoyment of political liberty, are unjustly denied a most sacred right, and kept out of an inheritance which is the very basis of all liberty and property.

If it be unjust to suspend the nation's enjoyment of this right and this liberty for six parts in seven of human life, it must be alike unjust to suspend it for two parts in three. When, Sir, you shall have considered this reasoning, I trust you will revolt at the notion of triennial parliaments. And if, Sir, we wish to know what our ancestors considered as a parliament's "constitutional duration," we have only to open the Statute Book in the 4th and 36th years of Edw. III, in both of which years a confirmation of Magna Charta having been part of the work in parliament, here is proof that the doctrine there laid down, touching parliaments themselves, was intended to shew forth the constitution in respect of them. In the first of these years it was accorded, "that a parliament shall be holden every year once, or

"more often if need be:" And in the second it was enacted, "that a parliament shall be holden every year, as another time was accorded by statute."—The words are "a parliament," that is, not a part, a fraction, a session, but a whole parliament; and in this sense the phrase of "a parliament," in contradistinction to a session, is in the Statute Book used to this day.—Hence it is most surprizing, that a person possessing the ability of a Blackstone should fall into so gross an error, as to remark, that by the aforesaid statutes of Edw. III, the king is bound to convoke a parliament "every year, or oftener, if need be. Not that he is, or ever was, obliged by these statutes to call a new parliament every year; but only to permit" [a pretty expression in a free country] "a parliament to sit annually for the redress of grievances, and dispatch of business." Comm. b. 1. c. 2.—It is surprizing, I say, how a Blackstone could do such violence to just criticism in so plain a case; because he must have known that when in those days parliaments were "convened" twice, or thrice, or four times in a year, it invariably was, in every instance, by a new writ; and that consequently the king was obliged, by those statutes, to call a new parliament every year.

This is apparent, not merely from the fact of the regular issuing of new writs, but also from their contents. A parliament was convened to consult on the "great and weighty affairs" which occasioned the summons. Having dispatched the same, which rarely required many days, there was no longer a cause of continuance, and the parliament was then of course dissolved; for prorogations were not then invented, nor for several ages afterwards. Hence it is clear, that in the ideas of our forefathers of that age, parliaments of a "constitutional duration," were sessional parliaments, for none other could have entered into the imaginations of the authors of those statutes.

The "great and weighty affairs" of the nation, in our days, necessarily occupy a parliament for a large portion of every year; and as more than one parliament in one year would be evidently unnecessary, burthensome, and extremely inconvenient, so we are now warranted in remarking that parliaments ought to be annual, and to have continuance for the whole year, or very nearly so, as a provision against sudden and unexpected contin-

gencies, which might arise out of the ordinary session: But that a longer duration, being utterly contrary to the constitution, and inconsistent with national liberty, ought never to be endured.

Swift, who in the case before us was as well qualified as Blackstone, to understand the recited statutes of Edw. III, not only construed them, in respect of the duration of parliaments, as I do, but held them in religious veneration. "I adore," says he, "the wisdom of that Gothic institution, which made them annual; and I was confident our liberty could never be placed upon a firm foundation, until that antient law was restored among us." After language so decisive of his opinion, how unaccountable was his carelessness when in the same breath he says, "the commerce of corruption between the ministry and the deputies, would neither answer the design nor the expence, if parliament met once a year." But still this word, "met," no more than the word, "holden," in the statutes of Edw. III, can cause any real obscurity in the passage here quoted.—The opinion, Sir, of Swift, is the more worthy of your regard, as he was cotemporary with triennial parliaments from first to last, and knew them well; and when, only four years after their departure, he thus gives his opinion, it is evidently with no small disgust at the recollection of their turpitude, that he contemplated annual parliaments with so much enthusiasm. He well knew both the origin and the exit of triennial parliaments to have been foul and tyrannical. The Convention Parliament, which accomplished the Revolution, first assembled in February, 1689, (according to our present stile) and continued for the remainder of that year. The succeeding parliament commenced in March 1690; when it soon appeared that William and this parliament shewed as little respect for the constitution, or for the fundamental laws of the land, as Charles and his Pensioner Parliament had done; for William disloyally continued this parliament, without the smallest regard to a "constitutional duration," and the commons had the treachery to sit for four years and a half. One year before their dissolution they passed the Triennial Act, purporting to enable the crown to keep the same parliament together for any term not exceeding three years. Thus these men, who, for the most part, had been active in expelling from the throne and kingdom the Stuart

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race of kings, for tyranny and misgovernment, by a tyranny as flagrant as the worst act of those despots, passed an act of parliament to deprive the nation of its political liberty, for two years in every three. Such was a triennial parliament's origin!

After an existence of three and twenty years, a triennial parliament discovered, that the lengthening of parliaments beyond their constitutional duration, had "proved very grievous and burthensome, "by occasioning much greater and more "continued expences, in order to elections "of members to serve in parliament, and "more violent and lasting heats and animosities among the subjects of this "realm, than ever were known before:" but, instead of recurring to the constitution and its short parliaments, as the proper and obvious cure of the evils complained of, they, with singular effrontery, and in direct contradiction to their own reasoning in the preamble, pass an Act, for giving all subsequent Parliaments "continuance for seven years." Such was a triennial parliament's foul and treacherous exit!

As to the character of triennial parliaments, their historian hath told us, that "when the ministry was in alliance with "the Whigs, the majority of both houses "was Whig; when with the Tories, they "became Tory."—In short, all was craft, faction, and perfidy. About the time of passing the Triennial Bill, some such member as Colonel Wardle "set on foot "an enquiry into their own venalities, "which opened such a scene of iniquity, "as, in the comparison, made the Pensioner Parliament of king Charles II, "seem innocent*."

I have thus, Sir, laid before you what I know, and what I think, of triennial parliaments; and sorry have I been to find any friend of liberty, at this crisis, either the advocate or the apologist for such parliaments. Some there are who rejecting them in principle, as unconstitutional, do yet recommend a return to them in the way of Reform, as a step towards a recovery of our liberties; on an assumed notion that the nation will be more desirous of triennial than of annual parliaments; and as if all experience did not prove the folly of attempting, against a gigantic state corruption, which confers

on an oligarchy of usurpers sovereign power, a step-by-step Reformation! To this assumption, and to this conduct, I have amongst many others, nine substantial objections, which I will now state: 1. I am myself no prophet, and therefore cannot foreknow that the Nation would act contrary to common sense, and the principle of self-preservation. 2. I do not believe that these prophesying persons are themselves prophets. 3. I cannot reconcile it to myself to recommend a positive evil, and a gross violation of the constitution, on a mere baseless surmise (contrary to experience) of its leading to a possible good. 4. I am not for attempting to cheat, delude, and mislead the nation, by preaching corrupt doctrine, and setting an unconstitutional example, while at the same time I am ignorantly imputing to that nation folly and baseness, and a preference in its own case, of injustice to justice, slavery to freedom. 5. Had I evidence of the nation's folly, apathy, and inclination to servitude, it should seem more worthy of English gentlemen to enlighten, to animate, and to rouse their countrymen, by the honest words of truth, and the spirit-stirring influence of manly exertion in the cause of obvious liberty; than to become the benumbing teachers of ignorance, and the puerile authors of sneaking measures, which are just as likely to wrest from the corrupt grasp of the accursed borough faction, our mangled constitution, as our pretty little armies are likely to wrest from the gigantic grasp of Buonaparté, the Iberian peninsula, without first insisting on it, as a *sine qua non* condition, that not a single English soldier shall be remaining on Iberian ground, unless the governments of Spain and Portugal shall be radically reformed, and the people completely emancipated. 6. As it is most certain there will be no Parliamentary Reform at all, until loudly called for by the public voice, it will be as easy for that voice, when it do speak, to thunder the word "annual," as to mumble the word "triennial." 7. As truth and liberty address themselves to the human understanding and heart, with infinitely more force than error and abasement, so the nation may far more easily be roused to exertion for a real, visible, tangible, birthright freedom, made the immediate prize of manly exertion; than persuaded to contend in shackles for a something of which they can have no distinct conception, and consequently no strong feeling;

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* Detection of the Parliament of England, I. 121, 160, 163.

a something which at best can only be explained to be an approximation to an amelioration of their condition; at which approximation to an amelioration of their condition, they may hope their grandchildren, or later descendents, will arrive; that is, when the borough faction can be reasoned into honesty and justice. 8. Thirty years ago, when the cry for a triennial parliament did (in my recorded judgment at the time) paralyze the patriotism of the nation, that cry might have its apology in our being then only on the threshold of discussion: But after that discussion has teemed with unanswerable arguments against any thing so unconstitutional, the revival of such cry at this time, would, in my opinion, be little short of insanity, and a presumptive proof that our liberties were gone beyond redemption. 9thly and lastly: The subduer of kingdoms and empires is abroad. No state has yet proved itself able to resist him; because in none which he has attacked, had the people the blessing of liberty, to make their state worth fighting for. England's turn is not distant. England therefore, must immediately determine to be free, or prepare her neck for the French yoke.

Such, Sir, is my reasoning; And I mean it to apply, not only to the mischievous error of aiming at a triennial parliament, but against all half-measures—the offspring of indistinct conceptions and timidity—and all proposals of circuitous courses for recovering our liberties. For such courses we have not time. Such counsels are therefore out of season. The crisis of our fate demands an instant decision: we must be now free, or never.

I subscribe myself, Sir,
your obedient servant,
JOHN CARTWRIGHT.

THE EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

Sir;—Although the sentiments of the Edinburgh Reviewers were formerly known to be against the principle of Parliamentary Reform, yet, it was hoped, by some of the friends of that measure, who considered that the talents of these journalists might have been a tower of strength to the cause, that the growing pressure of our pecuniary burdens; the daily, hourly, increasing embarrassments, and danger of our political situation; and more than all, the base and shameless devotion of the house of commons to the views of the

ministry, so strongly exemplified during the last session of parliament; might have weakened their faith in the present “practice and true principles of the constitution,” which they have so elaborately extolled in an article on Cobbett's Register in 1807, and that they might have been led to doubt the efficacy of that system of kingly and aristocratical influence in the house of commons, which they have represented as essential to the very existence of the constitution itself. But no, the Edinburgh Reviewers, whether from a desire to maintain their consistency,—a seeming want of which in others had so strongly excited their indignation, or whether, (and it is with some degree of pain that we admit the supposition,)—lured to their former opinions, by the hope, at no very distant time, of *again* basking in the sunshine of ministerial power, and which, under another system, might be less genial to plants of Scottish growth; whether, I say, it were these or what other motive that secured their attachment to the present order of things, we presume not to decide: the fact is apparent that they have defended their doctrine, in their last number, with all the force of their eloquence, and with every exertion of their talent and ingenuity.—It were hopeless to attempt to follow them through the windings, and shiftings of the lengthened and studied defence of their creed. To separate truth from fallacy, and sound argument from sophistry, when blended with such skilful hands, is an operation too difficult to be undertaken but by men of strong heads, and laborious habits. The few cursory observations we shall make on the general nature and effect of their doctrine, we hope, may induce the admirers of these celebrated critics, to peruse with great caution their political tenets, and to doubt at least the purity of their constitutional principles, whatever may be their opinions of their skill in criticism, or the extent of their literary acquirements.—The Edinburgh Reviewers have taken care in the pursuit of their argument, to soften down the asperity of their opposition to the reformers, by occasional concessions, and friendly professions towards a partial alteration in the house of commons: but their professions and their assumed tone of sincerity in wishing to see all the abuses of the government purged away, may be looked upon as mere rhetorical artifice, intended to entrap the unwary into an acknowledgment of

their principles; and they are in fact as decidedly adverse to an effectual Parliamentary Reform, as Mr. Perceval, or any of the present, or would-be ministers themselves. They are mere temporizers, soothing the country under its present afflictions, but without a wish to remove the cause of them.—The impression that their late article on this subject is calculated to make, is; That *any* reform must be inadequate to remove, or materially to lighten the weight of taxes under which the country is sinking; That these taxes, and all their consequent evils, have arisen from the prosecution of wars undoubtedly popular, and that the people have, therefore, only themselves to blame for their accumulated grievances; That the present mode of electing representatives to parliament, and the present manner of influencing them when so elected, is not only legal, and right, but is, in fact, the judicious practice, and true principles of the constitution: And that to attempt any reform is dangerous, and unnecessary, as the present system, under wise and provident leaders, is fully equal to the removal of those abuses, which are the most unpopular and irritating; (what abuses are not unpopular we are yet to learn;) and that we may hope at some future period, with such leaders, for a reduction of our public debt, a curtailment of our establishments, and a more economical expenditure of the national resources.—This then is all the consolation that these acute reasoners and able logicians, in the abundance of their legislative wisdom, are able to administer to the drooping spirits of the nation! They moreover inform us, that “in the present state of things it is the obvious policy of a minister to be economical in his measures,” and which policy, “is full as good a security for their adoption, as the warmer zeal and higher sense of duty of a reformed legislature.” So then we are to rest our security from further oppression in the shape of taxes, not upon the sense of duty of our rulers, or their desire to be economical, but upon the necessity of their being careful of the existing revenue of the public; the people having nothing more to give, or they to expect. Rest satisfied, therefore, ye people of England, with your governors present and to come, for the Edinburgh Reviewers assure us, that having screwed from you almost your last penny, their “obvious policy” is to make the most of what they now get!—In what relates to

the popularity of the wars which have unquestionably brought upon the country its present embarrassments, the Edinburgh Reviewers must pardon us if we require other proof than their bare assertion of their having been so. They would however gain nothing by a full admission of the fact; for it is the extravagant, unnecessary, and corrupt expenditure of their money, of which the people complain, and not of any spirited and liberal application of their resources. The popular voice, supposing it to exist, may be a good reason for entering upon a war, but can never be a justification of the improvidence and corruption of public men in the conduct of it. But we deny altogether that any of the wars alluded to were called for by the people; and we consider the delusion of a popular cry to be one of the degrading means by which the country has been betrayed into its misfortunes, and the propagation of which, may always be looked upon as a most artful and powerful auxiliary of a polluted administration. It has hitherto been an easy matter; but we hope that day is now past, for the government to give an appearance of popularity to all its political schemes. The moment a measure was resolved upon, the ministerial emissaries were let loose to counteract and overwhelm opposition before it could well appear. The innumerable public prints, and hireling scribblers, connected with the leaders of national affairs, immediately extolled the wisdom and necessity of the thing. Not only in the metropolis, but in the provincial towns, and villages, the whole host of greedy expectants, whether in black, red, or grey coats, gave vent to these intolerable rables in vindication of their political patrons; the distributors of the loaves and fishes. These swarms of pestilential insects, that fatten upon the offal, as it were, of the public plunder which drops from their superiors, infest every society, and buzz around and poison every social company into which they can by any means thrust their heads. Such have been the tricks of every ruling junto, since that blessed time which introduced ministerial influence into the house of commons; that precious period which the Edinburgh Reviewers hail as the birth-day of “regular freedom.” But this is not the voice of the people: that voice is never appealed to, but is lost in the hubbub, and senseless clamour of contractors, speculators, place-hunters, and their sneaking tribe of fol-

lowers. The good sense and honesty of the country retire abashed, and ashamed of such company, and suffer quietly the growing injuries brought upon them by this cormorant crew, rather than encounter open insult, and brutal violence: But this disgraceful apathy cannot, nor ought not, to continue much longer. Truth and honesty must triumph at last. Had Mr. Pitt listened in 1793 to the real voice of the nation, and distrusted a little the suggestions of his own political wisdom, or vanity, he would scarcely have plunged the country into a war, merely on account of the paltry provocations of the then unstable and mad government of France. But Mr. Pitt falsely calculated upon humbling this haughty enemy, and upon himself cutting a brilliant figure in the negotiations of Europe. If instead of upholding this measure by extravagant exaggerations of the danger of French principles, and French revolutions, he had kept a tight hand upon the few factions at home, and had conceded to the just demands of the major and reasonable part of the country; redressed their grievances, and regulated the representation, even according to his own expressed judgment, he would have established his fame on a much more solid foundation than it rests upon at the present day. It is from this time that we are to date the rapid accumulation of our most pressing calamities. The rupture of Addington's treaty was evidently popular, because to abide by it was evidently more dangerous than war. It is the same conviction that upholds the popularity of the war at this moment; it is popular by necessity; if that can be said to be popular which admits not of a choice. But we are not hence to conclude, that the people are accessory to their own degradation, because they acquiesce in an unavoidable evil. So far from the people being at any time anxious or clamorous for war, it may be securely laid down as a principle that the real popular sentiment of all countries is ever in opposition to begin war under any circumstances. When a war is once begun, it is true, that the people may be artfully led by a thousand ways to give it in appearance their sanction. Even the best feelings of their nature; honour, national-pride, patriotism, may be entrapped into this service. But it would be highly unjust, therefore, to reproach them with being the cause of the distresses which the result might bring upon them. As well might the people of

England be said to have dictated the miserable policy which has marked our conduct towards Spain, because it was the universal and animated wish of the nation to afford effectual assistance and relief to that unhappy country.—The present system of administering the English constitution is said by the reviewers to be "expedient." It is pretended that the three great balancing powers of king, lords, and commons, cannot perform their operations with smoothness and effect without narrowing the sphere of their action, and concentrating their force in the house of commons; and this is to prevent those rude collisions which have heretofore subverted the monarchy. This union of the three great controuling powers, which is in fact a collusion against the people, they have the barefacedness to denominate the "true principles of the English constitution." They might as well have said at once, what would scarcely have deserved more contempt; that in order to secure the people from the effects of corruption, is to make it more certain, and practicable, by making it easier to be accomplished. It is no information or satisfaction to us to be told that this has been the practice since the æra of the Revolution. We know it has, and we also know full well the consequences. It is because it has so long been practised, and that it does at this moment exist, that we complain: nor shall we cease to complain till it is remedied, that is, till a free and full representation of the people is established. The *Edinburgh Reviewers* may flourish their eloquence as much as they please on the weakness and corruption of human nature, and on the impossibility of making any alteration for the better, in the house of commons, so long as it is so. We think that there is, at least, as much reason, and philosophy too, in the plan that goes to remove temptation out of its way, as in that which professes to establish a basis of corruption upon principle, and then justifies its pernicious effects on the plea of expediency.—To support this argument, they, as well as all others who have advanced it, have recourse to the examples which occurred in the reign of the Stuarts. It is triumphantly asserted that their misfortunes are to be attributed to an attempt to abide by the theory of the constitution, and neglecting to establish an influence in the house of commons: while the abominable attempts of the whole of this family to overturn the constitution altogether, are

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carefully kept out of sight. Hume, who is the acknowledged apologist of the Stuarts, does not however venture to legitimate this practice in their behalf. And in his *Essays on Government*, where it is to be remembered that he speaks speculatively, though he thinks that the king must have an influence there, to counteract the omnipotence of the commons, it never entered his head that the aristocracy must have one also; and he is particularly cautious to state the difficulty of pointing out the due proportion to be allowed, and even laments the impossibility of doing so with any degree of certainty or efficacy: "There is," says he, "in this case a peculiar difficulty, which would embarrass the most knowing, and most impartial examiner."—Mr. Laing too, in his history, though he points out the neglect of this measure as the cause of the unhappy convulsions which agitated the country in the reign of the Stuarts, he is far from recommending it, like the Edinburgh Reviewers, either as a necessary or a constitutional proceeding. Both these historians have on the other hand bestowed upon the Stuarts the general character, they so justly deserved, of being arbitrary and bigoted to the last degree. In fact the whole period of their reign was an attempt to establish absolute power, and to destroy those rights and privileges of the people, which they had sworn to maintain inviolate. Are we then to illustrate new maxims of government, and to justify encroachments upon the English Constitution, from examples of this nature? Could the Stuarts have been satisfied to have reigned according to the laws of England, their posterity might at this moment have been on its throne, and, by so reigning, the Edinburgh Reviewers would have been deprived of the opportunity of exercising their ingenuity at the expense of their judgment and candour, in defending a system which in their consciences they cannot approve.—There is one artifice in great vogue with the opposers of Parliamentary Reform, and which the Edinburgh Reviewers practise in common with the rest, which ought not to escape notice. It is by constantly praising, and keeping the public attention fixed upon the degree of liberty we enjoy, and the impartial distribution of justice in this our happy country. They do not perhaps recollect that we owe that impartial distribution chiefly, if not solely, to the ministers of justice being unconnected with that precious "influence," which is the idol of

their wishes. And they choose to forget, that while we have freedom of speech, and liberty of person, we are daily deprived of those comforts which make the latter an enjoyment; and that the former, when not prostituted to the basest purposes, is unhappily more in use to complain of our grievances than to extol the blessings derived from our "invaluable" constitution. The secret of this mode of conduct may be traced in the following words of the Edinburgh Reviewers, which may be referred to in the 10th Vol. p. 277, of their political lucubrations.—"Those who expect to see a nation rise as one man, in consequence of the gradual and regular increase of their pecuniary burthens, must found their hopes upon histories of human affairs, and views of human nature, which the rest of the world are not in possession of."—Being safe, therefore, on this head, they consider that the only thing necessary to secure a smooth and easy current to the present or any system of government, is to avoid shocking too rudely the public mind by any alarming encroachments on its liberty; and to leave it unmolested in the possession of its popular opinions, and prejudices. It is possible, however, that even these Machiavelian expounders may be out in their calculations.

R.

Staffordshire, 1st Oct. 1809.

STATE OF SPAIN.

Sir;—How little it can be expected that the people of Spain will rise in mass to resist the French, we may draw a pretty accurate conclusion from the following passages in FISCHER'S *PICTURE OF VALENCIA* (translated from the German, written in 1802, lately published).—Page 172. "Imposts. These are divided into royal and manorial. The former are very inconsiderable, and are confined to what is here called the equivalent, which is a very moderate tax on income. [Valencia is not subject to the *sisas* or the *milliones*, or in general to the oppressive *rentas provinciales*, which are exacted in the provinces belonging to the crown of Castile.] The latter are more oppressive than in any other province of Spain. They consist in the appropriation in kind, sometimes of a fifth or sixth, at others even of one fourth or one third of the *whole produce* of the toil of the industrious husbandman. To this must be added, a great number of privileges or rather usurpations, such as

privileged presses, ovens, shops and posadas, which are likewise extremely oppressive.—The origin of those barbarous rights must be sought in the ancient feudal system. After the conquest of Valencia in 1238, the kings of Arragon divided the lands among their nobles, who assumed the right of taxing their vassals at their own discretion.—The total expulsion of the Moors in 1609, produced no alteration in this system.—The farmer of this country, notwithstanding the fertility of the soil, and his own indefatigable exertions, is never able to acquire a decent competence.—Can it be surprising, that, weary of such oppression, he should more than once have risen against the nobility and the landed proprietors in general, and should have demanded the abolition of those rights, which might with more propriety be denominated unjust usurpations?—Should, however, a revolution break out at some future period in Spain, these oppressions will, doubtless, furnish the first occasion for it. The events of 1802, are still fresh in the recollection of every reader. The government took the greatest pains to conceal them: for they were of a much more serious nature than is generally supposed.”

B. C.

MERCHANTS IN THE ISLAND OF ST. THOMAS.

Sir;—It is a fact of public notoriety that British subjects, are by their government, permitted and encouraged to reside in neutral countries, into which they annually import British manufactured goods to a considerable amount, and which (by residing under a neutral flag) they are enabled to introduce into the colonies of our enemies.—The amount of British manufactured goods, that, in time of war, are, by these means, forced into the colonies of our enemies, is truly astonishing; and is consequently highly advantageous to the English nation.—The hides, coffee, cotton, and indigo, which were received from the Spaniards and others in payment of the British goods which were disposed of to them, (under the protection of the neutral flag) were shipped to England, the duties on which paid a very large revenue (and independent of the shipping employed) was of course highly beneficial to the nation.—The profits, which in the course of time, were realized by the merchant, in prosecuting this trade, were finally

vested, either in the funds, or in the lands, purchased in Great Britain, for the Englishman, (whose habits and modes of life seldom coincide with those of foreigners) invariably keeps his eye fixed on his native soil, and anxiously counts the days that he is compelled to absent himself from that country and those friends, to whom he is so strongly attached. This trade, it appears then, was equally beneficial to the English government; and to the individual who carried it on; but while the merchant is engaged in his accustomed pursuits, he is surprized by a sudden declaration of war; his ships and property are overtaken at sea, (for at the time of their sailing even the possibility of a war could not have been foreseen); he is carried into an Admiralty Court, where that property, which would ultimately have been sent to England, and would have paid for those very British manufactured goods, (which under the neutral flag, he had been introducing among our enemies) is condemned as being the property of an enemy!!! These, Sir, are no imaginary evils, but a true and faithful statement of the consequences which befel many English subjects, who resided in the Danish West India islands, previous to the late declaration of war against Denmark, and a reference to the records of the West India Admiralty Courts, will but too strongly corroborate the fact.—The foregoing statement, although but an outline of the subject, will, Sir, I trust, be sufficient to engage the attention of government to the excessive hardship of the case; but here, Sir, unfortunately, the evil does not rest: the advantages which belonged to this port formerly, of course ceased with its neutrality; but the extravagant fees, and charges of office, which have been imposed since its capture, do in fact amount to nearly a prohibition to any vessels entering this once flourishing, but now ruined port.—I am, Sir,

St. Thomas, July 1, 1809.

A. B.

Correspondence between MR. PERCEVAL, AND LORDS GREY AND GRENVILLE.

No. I.—*Letter sent in duplicate to Earl Grey and Lord Grenville.*

Windsor, Saturday, Sept. 23, 1809.

My Lord—The Duke of Portland having signified to his Majesty his intention of retiring from his Majesty's service, in consequence of the state of his Grace's

health, his Majesty has authorized Lord Liverpool, in conjunction with myself, to communicate with your Lordship and Lord Grey, for the purpose of forming an extended and combined Administration.—I hope, therefore, that your Lordship, in consequence of this communication, will come to town, in order that as little time as possible may be lost in forwarding this important object, and that you will have the goodness to inform me of your arrival.—I am also to acquaint your Lordship, that I have received his Majesty's commands to make a similar communication to Lord Grey of his Majesty's pleasure.—I think it proper to add, for your Lordship's information, that Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Secretary Canning have intimated their intentions to resign their offices.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

SPENCER PERCEVAL.

No. II.—*Answer from Earl Grey.*

Howick, Sept. 26.

Sir,—I have this evening had the honour of receiving your letter of the 23rd, informing me, that, in consequence of the Duke of Portland's intention of retiring from his Majesty's service, his Majesty had authorised you, in conjunction with the Earl of Liverpool, to communicate with Lord Grenville and myself, for the purpose of forming an extended and combined Administration, and expressing a hope, that, in consequence of this communication, I would go to town, in order that as little time as possible may be lost in forwarding this important object.—Had his Majesty been pleased to signify that he had any commands for me personally, I should not have lost a moment in shewing my duty and obedience, by a prompt attendance on his royal pleasure.—But when it is proposed to me to communicate with his Majesty's present Ministers, for the purpose of forming a combined Administration with them, I feel that I should be wanting in duty to his Majesty, and in fairness to them, if I did not frankly and at once declare, that such an union is, with respect to me, under the present circumstances, impossible. This being the answer that I find myself under the necessity of giving, my appearance in London could be of no advantage, and might possibly, at a moment like the present, be attended with some inconvenience.—I have thought it better to request, that you will have the goodness to lay my duty at the feet of his

Majesty, humbly entreating him not to attribute to any want of attachment to his Royal Person, or to diminished zeal for his service, my declining a communication, which, on the terms proposed, could lead to no useful result, and which might be of serious detriment to the country, if, in consequence of a less decisive answer from me, any further delay should take place in the formation of a settled government.

I am, &c.

GREY.

No. III.—*First Answer from Lord Grenville.*

Bocomoc, Sept. 25, 1809.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 23rd instant, and understanding it as an official signification of his Majesty's pleasure for my attendance in town, I shall lose no time in repairing thither, in humble obedience to his Majesty's commands.—I must beg leave to defer, until my arrival, all observations on the other matters to which your letter relates.

I have, &c.

GRENVILLE.

No. IV.—*Second Answer from Lord Grenville.*

Sept. 29, 1809.

Sir,—Having last night arrived here, in humble obedience to his Majesty's commands, I think it now my duty to lose no time in expressing to you the necessity under which I feel myself of declining the communication proposed in your letter; being satisfied that it could not, under the circumstances there mentioned, be productive of any public advantage.—I trust I need not say, that this opinion is neither founded in any sentiment of personal hostility, nor in a desire of unnecessarily prolonging political differences.—To compose, not to inflame the divisions of the Empire, has always been my anxious wish, and is now more than ever the duty of every loyal subject; but my accession to the existing Administration could, I am confident, in no respect contribute to this object; nor could it, I think, be considered in any other light than as a dereliction of public principle.—This answer, which I must have given to any such proposal if made while the Government was yet entire, cannot be varied by the retreat of some of its Members.—My objections are not personal—they apply to the principle of the Government itself, and to the cir-

cumstances which attended its appointment.—I have now, therefore, only to request, that you will do me the honour of submitting, in the most respectful terms, these my humble opinions to his Majesty, accompanied by the dutiful and sincere assurance of my earnest desire at all times to testify, by all such means as are in my power, my unvaried zeal for his Majesty's service.

I have, &c.

GRENVILLE.

No. V.—*Letter from Mr. Perceval to Lord Grenville.*

Sept. 29, 1809.

My Lord;—I lost no time in communicating to Lord Liverpool your Lordship's letter of this day.—It is with great concern that we have learnt from it, that your Lordship feels yourself under the necessity of declining the communication which I have had the honour to propose.—In proposing to your Lordship and Lord Grey, under his Majesty's authority, to communicate with Lord Liverpool and myself, not for the accession of your Lordship to the present Administration, but for the purpose of forming a combined and extended Administration, no idea existed in our minds of the necessity of any dereliction of public principle on either side.—Your Lordship may rest assured, that in communicating to his Majesty the necessity under which you feel yourself of declining the communication which I had the honour to propose to your Lordship, I will do every justice to the respectful terms, and the dutiful and sincere assurance of your Lordship's unvaried zeal for his Majesty's service, with which the expression of that necessity was accompanied.—I cannot conclude without expressing the satisfaction of Lord Liverpool and myself at your Lordship's assurance, that the failure of this proposal is not to be ascribed to any sentiment of personal hostility.

I have, &c. &c.

SP. PERCEVAL.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH PAPERS.—*Official Account, by General Cuesta, of the Battle of Talavera, to the Secretary at War, dated Seville, Sept. 7.*

Most Excellent Sir;—I removed my head-quarters on the 21st current, to Velada, according to what I mentioned in my former dispatch of the same night.

This communication was made after I had seen at Oropesa, in the evening of that day, the gallant and illustrious army of the English.—These forces having all reunited in that town, I ordered my vanguard to be placed before Velada, concluding that the firing I then discovered, was a skirmishing of our parties with an advanced body of the enemy, stationed at that time in the district of Gamonal, two leagues distant from Talavera, and which in the sequel was routed and pursued to Casar. At break of day on the 22nd, my army being assembled in the extensive plain between Velada and Talavera, I directed that the vanguard, under the intrepid Chief Brigadier-General Don Josef de Zayas, should charge the enemy, who had been reinforced with the division of cavalry of General Latour Maubourg, and I directed that the divisions of infantry and cavalry should march in close order, that thus advancing towards Talavera, they might resist the attack, if the French should endeavour to force the entrance to this place, as they seemed to have determined. The dispatch of Zayas, No. 1. sent by this opportunity, will give you a perfect knowledge of what occurred on that morning. [This communication is promised in a new Supplement to the Seville Gazette, but was not published at the time of the departure of the vessel.]—The whole army followed the vanguard, passing by Talavera, and took up a position in the olive grounds, between that town, and the river Alberche.—The British army on the night of the 21st, marched from Oropesa, and on the following morning, united with us, and while the vanguard attacked and repulsed the enemy, the English also filed off by Talavera, to take up a position on our left, according to the plan agreed. It was, Most Excellent Sir, a magnificent exhibition, when we saw the combined armies in a plain of two leagues extent, advancing upon the enemy, and most brilliant and gratifying was the admirable order, firmness and gallantry, with which this movement was performed by our allies. The whole evening of the 22nd we were reconnoitering the camp of the enemy, when we took some prisoners between the wood and the olive grounds, who could not reach their vanguard, which had been obliged to retreat in consequence of an intrepid charge by our cavalry.—During the whole of the 23d nothing deserving notice happened. It was employed in examining the position of the ene-

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my, who had again concentrated his forces in the district of Casalegas, and on the adjacent heights, preserving his vanguard supported by some pieces of artillery on the bridge and shores of the river Alberche, and which fired the greater part of the day on our skirmishing parties.—I had agreed with the General in Chief of his Britannic Majesty's army, Sir Arthur Wellesley, as to the attack on the bridge and shores of the river before day break on the 24th, and to this purpose, I sent onward the 5th division of infantry under Marshal de Camp D. Luis de Bassecourt, in the evening of the 23d, in order, that after having crossed at the ford of Cardiel, three leagues from Talavera, they might march by the contiguous heights, so as by break of day on the 24th to fall on the rear-guard and right flank of the army of the enemy at Casalegas. At the same hour, I proposed to attack in person on the left flank, and a part of his front, while the English army assailed the whole of his right. The flight of the enemy during the night of the 23d disconcerted this plan, and when at dawn of the 24th, we saw the French camp abandoned, I thought it proper to follow them with my army alone (as the British army remained in Casalegas and the shores of the Alberche), with the hope of reaching his rear-guard, or some portion of it. The news which I acquired of his route, apprized me that he had proceeded in two columns by Santa Olalla and Cebolla, and in consequence, I divided my army so as to follow him in both directions. Notwithstanding the forced march of my army, who made their day's progress without fatigue, we could not accomplish our object, as the enemy had early commenced his retreat, and had proceeded with great rapidity. On the 24th, having posted myself in Santa Olalla, I ordered the troops which had taken the road of Cebolla to join me, with the exception of the 5th corps, which I left there to watch the district, placing the vanguard in the neighbourhood of Alcabon, from whence the piquets of the enemy were dislodged, and pursued to Torrijos, where a considerable part of the army of the enemy was stationed.

The whole of the 25th was engaged in giving repose to the troops, and in apportioning the rations, which were extremely deficient. Parties of the French during the day were employed either in endeavouring to dislodge us from our post, or to

reconnoitre our situation, but in both attempts they were disappointed by the valour of the officers commanding the skirmishing parties, who attacked them on all sides, and prevented their approach. At nine o'clock at night, of the same day, I had information that the enemy was advancing upon Torrijos, and that his whole army was in movement, but my advice did not instruct me to which point the greater part was proceeding. On hearing this, I apprised the Generals, and dispatched an officer to General Wellesley. In consequence of his determination and direction, and on finding my vanguard powerfully attacked on the morning of the 26th, by a very superior force, and the enemy indicating a design of making a general attack, I resolved to make a retrograde movement upon the Alberche, to reunite with the English, which I effected on the evening of the same day. The dispatches of Brigadier-General Don Josef de Zayas, and of Lieutenant-General the duke of Alburquerque, Nos. 2 and 3 (not yet published) explain the particulars of the action on the morning of that day, and in which the corps there mentioned acquired great credit for their firmness and valour, &c.—Thus the evening of the 26th concluded; and after having conferred with General Wellesley that night on our situation, I resolved to repass the Alberche on the morning of the following day, when we agreed that the right line should be taken by the Spanish, and the left by the English army. The English vanguard remained during that night in Casalegas, and on the heights near it, under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, with orders to retire to the opposite side of the river, which were obeyed on the morning of the 27th.—I must now observe, that at dawn on the 24th Marshal Victor had withdrawn from the post he occupied on the shores of the Alberche, in order to avoid the attack meditated on that day by the allied armies; and he afterwards united himself, in the neighbourhood of Toledo, with the forces under General Sebastiani, and with 8,000 men composing the guard of the Royal Impostor, who took the command of the whole, thus congregated assisted by Marshals Jourdon and Victor, and by General Sebastiani.—It now appeared that the enemy wished to bring on a general action, by the frequent approach of his advanced guard, and by the occupation of Santa Olalla by the whole of his army on the evening of the 26th. His outposts

then approached the allied army. Thus circumstanced, at break of day on the 27th, the position agreed upon was taken; and Sir Arthur Wellesley ordered General Mackenzie, with a division of English infantry and a brigade of cavalry, to continue in the olive plantation on the right side of the Alberche, where this party, composing the vanguard, might cover the right flank of the British army.—The whole combined army occupied an extent of ground of above three miles; the right towards the Tagus, was covered by our native troops reaching to the front of Talavera. The ground on the left was occupied by the English army, open to and commanded, by an elevation, where was assembled in a second line a division of English infantry, under the orders of Gen. Hill. Between this height and a chain of mountains at some distance, there is an inclosure, which, in the first instance, Gen. Wellesley did not order to be defended, because it was commanded by the height, and because it was considered too distant to be useful in the approaching battle. The whole of the ground on which the Spanish army was drawn up, was covered with olive plantations intersected by sinuosities, inequalities, and cottages. The great road towards the bridge of Alberche was defended by a strong battery, served by our infantry, in front of the Hermitage of Our Lady of the Prado. The other avenues of the district were defended in a similar manner. Talavera was protected by an appointed garrison, and the rest of the Spanish infantry, forming two lines, was placed behind a village which is at the extremity of the district, and formed a line in continuation of the position taken by the English army. In the centre, and between the two armies, there was a rising ground, where the English had begun to construct a strong redoubt, having in their rear a small plain. At this point was stationed the English General Campbell, who commanded a division of infantry, supported by the brigade of dragoons of General Cotton, and by some squadrons of our cavalry.—Our combined army being thus arranged, the enemy presented himself in considerable force to our view, manifesting, at first, an intention to attack the division of the vanguard under General Mackenzie. In point of fact, he fulfilled this design before that Officer was enabled to retire to his proper position, but these gallant and disciplined troops which composed the brigade of General Mackenzie, of

Col. Donkins, the brigade of cavalry of General Anson, and their corps, supported by General Payne, with four regiments of cavalry, posted in the plain and olive grounds of Talavera, retired in most admirable order, but not without some loss in the olive grounds, particularly two of the corps of this division. The regularity, steadiness, and fortitude of all these troops, as well as the military talents of General Mackenzie, were conspicuous in every movement, and this officer is deserving of the highest praise and admiration for the coolness and serenity with which he withdrew this division to the left of the British army. The number of the enemy increased on the right bank of the Alberche as the day advanced, and every thing indicated his determination to give battle to the combined forces.—As dusk approached, he commenced a furious attack by a cannonade, and a charge by the whole of his cavalry, on the right, occupied by the Spanish infantry, with the apparent design of breaking through our ranks, posted as I have before described. This attack was received by an active fire perfectly well sustained, both of cannon and musketry, which disconcerted the purpose of the enemy and put him to flight at a quarter past eight. During this time, a strong division of the French advanced by the valley to the left of the height occupied by the English General Hill, of which, with very great loss, they obtained a momentary possession, but Hill returned to the charge presently with the bayonet, drove off the enemy, and recovered his ground. In the night the French repeated their attack, but without succeeding, and with great loss. At break of day on the 28th they returned with two divisions of infantry, but they were repulsed by the brave Hill, who could not be intimidated by their repeated attempts, or by the progressive accumulation of the forces of the assailants.—General Wellesley, in consequence of these renewed exertions of the enemy by the valley, on the left side of the height, ordered thither two brigades of his cavalry, supported by Lieutenant General the Duke of Albuquerque, with the whole of his division of cavalry. The French, seeing this movement, sent sharp-shooters into the chain of mountains to the left of the valley, who were attacked by the 5th division of my infantry under Marshal de Camp Don Luis Bassecourt, who dislodged them with much loss.—The general attack commenced by the advance of different co-

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columns of the enemy's infantry with the intention of attacking the height occupied by General Hill. These columns were charged by two parties of English dragoons, under the command of General Anson, led by Lieutenant-General Payne, and supported by the brigade of cavalry of the line of General Tanne. One of these regiments of English dragoons suffered very much; but this spirited charge had the effect of disconcerting the designs of the enemy, who sustained a very great loss. At the same time, the French attacked the centre of the army, where the English General Campbell was stationed, having on his right Lieut. General Don Francisco de Eguia, the enemy was driven back by both these Generals, who had their infantry supported by the King's regiment of cavalry, and by the division of Lieutenant-General Don Juan de Henestrosa. This corps covered itself with glory in the charge that it made on the infantry of the enemy, during which it turned the column by which it was assailed; under which advantage, the English infantry, protected by the Spanish, possessed themselves of the artillery of the enemy. At the same time with these proceedings, the French attacked with fury the centre of the English army, commanded by General Sherbrooke. The foes were received with extraordinary courage, and were driven back by the whole English division, with charged bayonets. But the English brigade of guards, which was carried onward precipitately in the ardour of battle, advanced too far, and was in consequence obliged to withdraw under the fire of the second line, composed of the brigade of cavalry of General Cotton, and of a battalion of infantry detached from the height by Gen. Wellesley, as soon as he observed the remote situation of the guards. General Howorth, who commanded the English artillery, was distinguished for his extraordinary courage, and performed the most important services.—Lieutenant-General Don Francisco de Eguia, my second in command, was posted on my left, with the 3rd, 4th, and 5th divisions, under Generals the Marquis de Portago, Don Rafael Manglano, and Don Louis Alexandro Bassecourt, but the latter was ordered to support the division of cavalry of Lieutenant-General the Duke of Albuquerque, which was detached to reinforce the British army. The dispatches No. 4, 5, and 6, from these Generals, are inclosed for the information

of his Majesty.—I took under my particular orders the centre and the right, without neglecting, however, the superintendence of the rest, and with much satisfaction I noticed the conduct of the Generals of the 1st and 2nd division of the Marquis de Zayas, and Don Vicente Iglesias, as well as Don Juan Berhuy, and Lieutenant-General Don Juan Henestrosa, &c.—The loss of the enemy was very great. They left on the field of battle from four to five thousand men, and the number of their wounded is computed at 5,000 more. Two or three Generals were killed, several wounded, and at least 400 other officers. We have taken 19 pieces of artillery, and many waggons of ammunition, and the rout was one of the most complete, considering that we were acting on the defensive. The English have lost General Mackenzie, Brigadier-General Langworth, and other officers of distinguished rank and merit. The total of their officers, killed and wounded, is 260, and that of their rank and file 5,000. Our diminution is much less. Don Rafael Manglano was wounded, and 50 more of our officers were killed and wounded, and 1,150 rank and file. Our artillery was served with ability and fortitude, and the names of such officers, whose talents were most conspicuously displayed, are mentioned in the dispatches from the respective Generals.—I should be negligent of my own duty, if I did not communicate to your Excellency, for the information of his Majesty, that the conduct of the British General in Chief, Sir Arthur Wellesley, and that of the Generals, subordinate Officers, and Soldiers under his command, is above all praise. I have seen the enthusiasm with which these faithful allies have in copious streams poured forth their blood in the defence of our liberty, and no language can adequately express the sentiments of gratitude with which our breasts are animated. With the highest satisfaction I have noticed my army hailing our companions for the victory obtained, and mingling with exclamations indicative of the warmest affection, the appellatives of our country, and Ferdinand, with those of our powerful and generous allies.

[This liberal and spirited eulogy is succeeded by a list of the Officers and others of the Spanish army, who deserved the high reward of the approbation of their Commander, among whom is distinguished a lad of 16 years of age who killed four Frenchmen with his own hand. We are sorry our limits do not allow our inserting

the catalogue of the names of these brave champions of Spanish independence.]

Signed, GREGORIO DE LA CUESTA.
To his Excellency Don Antonio Cornel.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.—*From the French Official Paper, the Moniteur.*

The Moniteur of September 28, contains the following observations, in the form of Notes on the London Gazette of Saturday, Sept. 2, containing the dispatches from Lord Wellington, dated Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809:—

‘When I entered Spain, I had a communication with General Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puertode Banos, and the Puerto de Perales.’—(*London Gazette.*)

Note of the Moniteur.—We wish Lord Wellesley to command the English armies. With his character, he will risk great catastrophes. It appears that he has neither spies nor any accurate information; which is astonishing, in a country where England has so many partizans.

‘I preferred to go, from thinking that the British troops were most likely to do the business effectually.’

We are willing to believe that these dispositions were made; for we see in one of his dispatches that he thought he had only to do with 10 or 12,000 French; and it was possible that he might march, with 20,000 men, against a corps, which in his opinion, consisted only of 10 or 12,000; but he should have gained better information on his march, and he would have learned that this corps of 12,000 men amounted to 70,000. He had his retreat cut off, and was too fortunate to be able to throw himself, in order to escape, into impracticable roads. General Wellesley is inexcusable for not having known that the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, Elchingen, and Treviso, amounted to 70,000 men; and for having thought that he could cover his left flank against this formidable army, by leaving two battalions at Puerto Banos.—What ignorance!

‘I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me sufficient for giving up so important a post as Talavera.’

General Cuesta did right to leave Talavera; if he had delayed, he would have been lost. He did wrong to leave two divisions and 40 pieces of artillery on the

Tagus; he lost them; and this post, which was the rear-guard, was a post of honour. General Wellesley ought to have occupied it. It is acknowledged in war, that an advanced guard, or a rear-guard, according to the operations, is the post most important to defend. But General Wellesley had taken the lead; and, according to the laudable practice of his nation, had left to his allies the post of danger.

‘The enemy stated to be 30,000 strong, but at all events consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney.’

We see, that even at the time when he wrote, the English General did not know the force of the French. He speaks only of the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Elchingen, and appears to have no knowledge of the corps of the Duke of Treviso, twenty-five battalions strong, and which, since their entrance into Spain, have not been inferior to the best troops in Europe. If Lord Wellesley frequently commits similar errors in war, he may one day pay dearly for them.

‘We had reason to expect the advance of Victor’s corps to Talavera, as soon as General Cuesta’s march should be known; and after leaving 12,000 men to watch Venegas, and allowing from 10 to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late action, this corps would have amounted to 25,000.’

This is a singular calculation which Lord Wellesley makes of the first and fourth corps and the reserve. The first corps is composed of 36 battalions, the fourth of 30; the reserve of 20 battalions, and the cavalry of 40 squadrons. Lord Wellesley had therefore around him 170 battalions, and 80 or 90 squadrons, and he expected to conquer Madrid with 20,000 men! We do not speak of the Spaniards; they may be reckoned as of consequence for plundering isolated persons, or for defending themselves behind a wall, but very little account can be made of them in a regular battle, as the English may have been convinced. If Lord Wellesley had had, besides his 20,000 men, the whole army of Lord Chatham, which went to bury itself, in the marshes of the Isle of Walcheren, he could have derived nothing from his expedition but disgrace, confusion, and defeat. If the English mean to dispute Spain with France, they must land an army, if not equal to the French army, at least two-thirds as strong, that is to say, of at least 150,000 men, for the Spaniards cannot be reckoned

for more than one-third in a regular battle.—Nothing can be more advantageous to France than to have the English engage in land-wars; for then, instead of conquering England by sea, we shall conquer her on the continent. Such a contest shews to admiration what those are who direct the Cabinet of London.—Themistocles advised the Athenians to abandon their citadels, and take refuge on board their ships. It is to be wished that the British Cabinet may persist, as it has begun, in the plan of deserting its ships and throwing itself on the continent. We have predicted the humiliation of England, and peace, before a year elapses.—Before a year shall have expired, the English, whatever efforts they may make, will be driven out of the peninsula, and the imperial eagle will fly on the fortresses of Lisbon.

‘We had reason to expect, that, as the Marquis de la Reyna would not remove the boats from the river Almaraz, Soult would have destroyed them. Our only retreat was, therefore, by the bridge of Arzo Bispo; and if we had moved on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge, while the army should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would have deprived us of that only resource. We could not take a position at Oropesa, as we thereby left open the road to the bridge of Arzo Bispo, from Talavera, by Calera; and after considering the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion that it was advisable to retire to the bridge of Arzo Bispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus.’

We shall not continue these Notes; it would be an insult to our readers. The falsehood of the report of Lord Wellesley must be evident to every one.

Conclusion. Lord Wellesley, without knowing the force of the enemy with whom he had to contend, without being furnished with that which constitutes an army, advanced to Talavera. The idea of entering Madrid turned his brain. He took the French army for an army of Sepoys. He arrived at Talavera with 25 or 26,000 men. He was there joined by 30,000 Spaniards, and, with these two armies united, he intended to penetrate to Madrid. The Duke of Belluno manœuvred skilfully to draw him on, and formed a junction with the fourth corps and the reserve, and, with the King at their head, marched against the enemy. The Duke

of Dalmatia, with still more considerable forces than those of the King, marched upon their rear. Lord Wellesley could not extricate himself but by beating, separately, the two armies. The first and fourth corps presented him with an opportunity, since they attacked, without waiting for the three corps commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia. The English fought well; the battle of Talavera was doubtful; though the loss of the English was much more considerable than ours, for the French artillery was more numerous. It appears that, by a series of multiplied faults, the French could not take the position on the left; but the English were beaten back every time they attempted to advance upon the French. When the 70,000 men commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia were at Plasencia, Lord Wellesley believed there were not more than 10,000 men there, and formed the most ridiculous combinations. He perceived, however, the folly of his calculations, his extreme imprudence, and was sufficiently fortunate to escape into Portugal with his infantry. What would have been the case, if, manœuvring according to the principles of war, the French army had not given battle until all united? Lord Wellesley says, that the want of the means of conveyance prevented him from marching to Madrid. What would have been the consequence, if he had marched to Madrid, and the Duke of Dalmatia had placed himself between him and the Tagus? He would have come with his army to France. He has sacrificed brave men through presumption, and ignorance of that of which a General ought not to be ignorant.—This expedition greatly resembles that of General Moore in the month of November last. But General Moore was more prudent, and saved himself sooner; and, though he suffered enormous losses, the half of his army returned to England, without their baggage, &c. Like General Moore, General Wellesley abandoned his hospitals, his baggage, his artillery, and arrived in Portugal with the half of his army. At this moment he has not 18,000 men under arms, out of the 40,000 which left the ports of England.

The *Moniteur* of 30th Sept. after giving the following intelligence from an English Paper—

‘The whole British army has quitted Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley has his head-quarters at Elyas (1).—It is said

‘ this retreat has been occasioned by the
‘ want of provisions (2).—The French
‘ have returned to Madrid.’

has these Notes:—

(1). This is certainly a great success, and the English people owe much gratitude to Lord Wellesley for having destroyed a part of their troops, for having compromised the glory of their arms, for having fled sixty leagues pursued sword in hand, in fine—for having abandoned their allies. The King of England has rewarded these great services by conferring on General Wellesley the title of Lord Wellington, Viscount Talavera. Why does he not give, likewise, to Lord Chatham, the title of Duke of Walcheren? This reward would be as well merited as that which has been granted to Sir Arthur. We hope that the English General, who, in the course of this winter, will be driven into the Tagus and forced to evacuate Portugal, will receive the title of Duke of Lisbon. Thus the French will find in the genealogy of the English Generals the list of their successes.—(2). It is impossible to find a worse excuse: What, was it in the middle of Spain, and when the English army had behind it Seville, Lisbon, and the Sea, that its retreat was occasioned by the want of provisions? It is impossible to sport more with the public credulity.—The English fled from the French bayonets, and the French troops, far from returning immediately to Madrid, pursued these fugitives as far as the heights would permit.

WAR BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND FRANCE, AND THE EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.—*Notes from the French Official Paper, the Moniteur, on the Articles published in the London Papers upon the above subjects.*

‘ We cannot consider the Austrian
‘ Monarchy, its Sovereign, and its armies, so entirely humiliated as they
‘ were after the battle of Austerlitz:
‘ there is no talk of an interview in a
‘ windmill.’—(*London Papers*).

Note by the Moniteur.—If there has been no interview, it is because the Emperor Napoleon would have none. The first interview, in which the Emperor Napoleon gave peace to his enemy, having left no remembrance of gratitude in the breast of the latter, it became evident that a fresh interview would be to no purpose.—With regard to the difference between the situations of Austria, after the battles of Aus-

terlitz and Wagram, it is this:—After the battle of Austerlitz, Russia was still allied with Austria; she had upon the Vistula a second army, which she might march; Prussia, who had signed the Convention of the 2nd of November, might take part in the war; in short, the army of Prince Charles was still untouched, and the whole of it might march. On the other hand, the important fortress of Raab and the Circles of Hungary had not been occupied; Saxony did not yet form part of the Confederation; and, however, the position of Dresden must be considered as of some importance; in fine, the Duchy of Warsaw belonged to Prussia, and the army of Galicia, which now menaces Moravia, did not exist. At present, on the contrary, all the Austrian armies and fortresses have been attacked and vanquished. There are hardly any vestiges remaining of the army which the Archduke John brought from Italy; and if it can still muster ten thousand men under arms, most of these men are only recruits. The grand army of Prince Charles being beaten at Eggmühl, at Ratisbon, at Esling, and at Wagram, has lost his best soldiers, and he himself, frightened at the spirit of intrigue and division which reigns in the Cabinet, has thrown up the command and retired. The difference is not less great in the internal situation of the Monarchy: after the Peace of Presburg, the French had only passed through the Hereditary States; upon the present occasion, they have already made a stay in them of upwards of four months. At that time Austria had not made the last efforts; her population was still entire; at present many provinces have been so much depopulated by the levies in mass, that no other inhabitants are to be found in the villages than women and children. At that time all the revolutionary means which had been taken existed, and might be employed: at present they have been taken, and have been taken in vain: the country is exhausted of men as well as of things.

‘ An army, formidable from the number of the soldiers (we wish we could
‘ say formidable from the talents of its
‘ Chiefs) has been sent by England and
‘ landed in Zealand.’—

The expedition against Zealand could not have any result for England. It might occasion some embarrassments, some fresh burdens to the people of France; but these they do not calculate, when any proofs of zeal or devotedness are to be

given to the country; it could give the English nothing but shame; it could be attended with no other result than to make them lose an army, whilst it would procure a new army to the Emperor. These prognostics have been perfectly verified.—We say that the expedition could not be attended with any result, because it was necessary to begin by making the siege of Flushing. Flushing, provided the island of Walcheren be inundated, must be considered by every sensible officer as a place impregnable, by a regular siege, or at least as presenting difficulties which the labour of four months would be unable to vanquish. In this instance, the wisest calculations were baffled. Flushing, when the besiegers trenches were still three hundred paces from the body of the fortress, when there was no breach, when the body of the fortress was untouched, surrendered by the sole effect of the terror of a bombardment. Is this cowardice? Is it treason? The sequel of the inquiry will prove which. Thus, then, the sole opposition of Flushing, which detained the English expedition only twenty days, ought to have detained it three months.—Of all the chances of succeeding, certainly the one least expected by the English, must have been such a success obtained by a bombardment; they required 20 days for that. Now, 20 days spent in the island of Walcheren, in the month of August, must have occasioned a number of sick, which cannot be computed at less than one in four soldiers; and to calculate otherwise would betray a total ignorance of the effects of that climate. When we say that 20 days spent in the island of Walcheren must cost the quarter of the troops which land in it, we may add, that the health of the other three quarters must be essentially impaired, and that all the weakened men are on the point of falling sick. It is therefore a most senseless attempt to land brave soldiers in that fatal country, and we must consider the English army as destroyed, or at least what remains of it, as unable to do much duty for several months to come.—But in fine, after the siege of Flushing, we had to expect the siege of fort Bantz, which communicating by water with Bergen-op-Zoom and with fort St. Martin, which the French have built opposite to it, could in like manner not be taken, but after works and trenches carried on in a country the climate of which is as fatal as Walcheren. It is true, that

the English were fortunate! A Dutch General, called Bruce, the shame of the military name, and whose head the nation must have to fall upon the scaffold, evacuated this fort through an unexampled panic six hours before the English arrived. Here, then, we again behold the English enjoying a good fortune upon which they could not rely; but these fortunate events, purchased with the ever-increasing diminution of their armies, whither could they carry them; to burn the French squadron? to effect this, it was necessary to take Antwerp. But in fine, the French squadron being taken and burned, it remains to be known whether such an operation was worth what it has cost, and whether it be very prudent to go to an expence of many men, and of 40 or 50 millions, in order to occasion one's enemy a loss of between 15 and 20 millions.

But the ships at Antwerp could not be taken. They did not depend upon the occupation of Flushing, upon that of Walcheren, nor of any island: they depended upon the Continent. It was necessary to take Antwerp! The English, who for this long time past have not travelled upon the Continent, consulted information collected six years ago, and imagined that Antwerp was still an open town, as it was when it was only a trading port; they did not take into their calculation the works of these latter years, especially those which the Emperor has caused to be raised since his journey to Antwerp. Upon establishing a dock-yard in that town, he ordered its fortifications to be again raised; it is now surrounded with a bastioned rampart. The ditch filled with water which covers this rampart has been repaired; the left of the town is covered by an immense inundation which removes the approaches upwards of fifteen hundred fathoms; the right is supported by the citadel, which is a fine piece of fortification; upon this front, several works have been established; among others, a fine half-moon with its counterscarp. Upon the left bank of the Scheldt there are no houses, but the head of Flanders has been re-established, and its works are protected by an inundation of 2,000 fathoms in extent. The English could not, therefore, take Antwerp without besieging it, without methodically opening the trenches, without working on through the inundations and marshes, in short, without having invested the town: and if they must invest it on

both sides, they would require to have two armies: 1st, One between the head of Flanders and the town of St. Nicholas, opposite to Brussels and to the road of France; indeed, we know no General bold enough to take this position with less than 80,000 infantry, and between 8 and 10,000 cavalry, since he must have to withstand the army which should arrive from France, and the troops should stretch out from the head of Flanders, that is to say, the whole garrison of Antwerp, which is a combined attack, would sally out on that side. On the side of the town, the investment could not reasonably take place with an army of less than 40,000 men, having in front a corps of observation, to keep in check the army of the Duke of Valmy, assembled at Maëstricht, which would draw near Antwerp, and having another corps towards Bergen-op-Zoom against the Dutch. It would, therefore, have been easier for Lord Chatham to take Brussels, to march against Ghent, and to advance as far as Flanders, leaving Antwerp and the French army behind him, than to undertake to invest Antwerp and besiege it. This much with regard to the same side;—

On the side of the river, the following are the obstacles which must have stopped the English:—1st. Fort Frederic and Fort Doel, each mounting fifteen 36-pounders; after these, Fort Lillo and the Fort of Liefkenshoek; each mounting sixty 36-pounders, and ten mortars; and behind, a line of eighty gun-boats and pinnaces, mounting two hundred 24-pounders. Now, every sensible man who knows that there is only a distance of 600 fathoms between Fort Lillo and the Fort of Liefkenshoek, which is opposite to it, perceives that this passage cannot be forced. With regard to fireships, it is well known that fireships and infernal machines are ineffectual. The infernal machine which was let off at St. Malo had no effect; these sorts of explosions were never able to shake a rampart. An estacado had been established, which secured our gun-boats from fire-ships. In fine, we had also fire-ships; sixteen were already in readiness, and we were going to avail ourselves of the first favourable occasion to send them against the English. Besides, to make use of fire-ships, it would have been necessary to approach within 500 fathoms of the town, since from Lillo to Antwerp the

Scheldt makes four elbows, which would have prevented fire-ships from being directed from any greater distance.—On the sea side in like manner no success could be hoped for; but admitting that by the combination of the effects of the land and sea, Lillo and Liefkenshoek had been carried, which supposes two regular sieges, the enemy would directly after have met with three other barriers to be forced; the Pearl fort, fort St. Philip, and fort St. Mary. All these forts are covered by inundations, and each of them would have required a separate siege. These different operations could not have taken place without losing 40 days more, and supposing that by the 20th of October the land and sea-forces had been able to approach within 2,000 fathoms of Antwerp, they still required three months more to take the town. With regard to the squadron, it was entirely shut up within the town, up and down the river, protecting Antwerp, and protected by it. The taking of Antwerp was, therefore, a thing impossible for Lord Chatham, an operation much more difficult to be effected than the occupation of a quarter of France.—However, the following was the system of the French army; from the 15th of August three corps were formed. The Prince of Ponte Corvo was at Antwerp with 30,000 men, national guards, regulars and Dutch troops. The Duke of Cornegliano was at Ghent with the corps of the head of Flanders, consisting of 25,000 men; the Duke of Istria was at Lisle with 20,000 men.—We should have let the English, had they seriously presented themselves, cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, stretch out beyond the inundation of Lillo, and march against Antwerp; the Duke of Cornegliano would have proceeded towards the Head of Flanders, and whilst the English would have been making their dispositions to invest Antwerp from fort Lillo, to the citadel, the Prince of Ponte Corvo and the Duke of Cornegliano, protected by the inundations and by the immense works of the town, would have waited for them, and on the day agreed upon, would have stretched out upon the right; and then the English armies would have terminated its destinies: the Duke of Istria would during that time have proceeded to the island of Cadsand.

(To be continued.)